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 In 2016, more than 35,000 people died in traffic crashes, and human error was the 
reason for 94% of these deaths. Researchers and automobile companies are testing 
autonomous vehicles in mixed traffic streams to eliminate human error by removing the 
human driver behind the steering wheel. However, recent autonomous vehicle crashes 
while testing indicate the necessity for a more thorough risk analysis. The objectives of 
this study were (1) to perform a risk analysis of autonomous vehicles and (2) to evaluate 
the safety impact of these vehicles in a mixed traffic stream. The overall research was 
divided into two phases: (1) risk analysis and (2) simulation of autonomous vehicles. 
Risk analysis of autonomous vehicles was conducted using the fault tree method. Based 
on failure probabilities of system components, two fault tree models were developed and 
combined to predict overall system reliability. It was found that an autonomous vehicle 
system could fail 158 times per one-million miles of travel due to either malfunction in 
vehicular components or disruption from infrastructure components. The second phase of 
this research was the simulation of an autonomous vehicle, where change in crash 
frequency after autonomous vehicle deployment in a mixed traffic stream was assessed. It 
was found that average travel time could be reduced by about 50%, and 74% of conflicts, 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The transportation system, the key to sociological and economic progress, has 
ebbed and flowed throughout the history of mankind to reduce travel time and increase 
comfortability. After many trials and tribulations, we can now move ourselves and 
transfer goods from one place to another, nearby or distant, by selecting one or multiple 
transportation mode alternatives. Whether the mode is a personal vehicle or airplane, the 
design features are based on customer/user preferences and perspectives. The evolution 
of the transportation system has undergone many modifications, while many modes have 
become extinct. In the stone age of antiquity, humans walked and ran upon the solid earth 
with bare feet (Demartini, 2014). Afterwards they tamed horses and horses became the 
primary mode of transportation for many years. Even though horse-drawn vehicles were 
carrying 120,000 passengers per day in New York by the late 1860s; yet, they were 
unwelcome as they were driven at very slow speeds and had unpleasant byproducts 
(McShane & Tarr, 2007; Tarr., 1996). Moreover, 200 people were killed in New York by 
horses and horse-drawn vehicles in 1900 (McShane, 1995). However, transportation 
systems modernized after the industrial revolution. The innovation of steam engines in 
the late 18
th
 century was the first major advancement for transportation. In 1801, the first 
steam engine automobile was exhibited in England. These first-generation automobiles 
were inefficient and had the same speed as horses. The automobile engine went through 
many further modifications over the next hundred years (Lab). Later, the combustion 
engine was invented, and automobiles became more efficient with faster speed. 
Moreover, personal transportation became more affordable day by day due to advances in 
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technologies. However, the overall transportation system has been overloaded due to the 
increased number of vehicles. According to a recent report card by the American Society 
of Civil Engineers (ASCE) (NHTSA, 2015), in 2014 traffic congestion cost $160 billion 
in wasted time and fuel in the United States (U.S.) which averaged out to 42 hours per 
driver annually. More than 2 out of 5 miles of urban interstates are congested with high 
volume of traffic (NHTSA, 2015). It is not just valuable revenues and resources that are 
being wasted due the traffic congestion. Unfortunately, these congested conditions 
provoke road rage and risky driving behaviors (Salomon & Mokhtarian, 1997). Risky 
driving behavior leads to traffic crashes and results in morbidity (number of drivers with 
injuries that eventually lead to death) and mortality (actual accident death count). More 
lives have been lost in traffic crashes than from human diseases for last many years 
(Petridou & Moustaki, 2000). According to NHTSA traffic safety fact sheets, traffic 
crashes were responsible for more than 35,000 deaths on U.S. roadways (NHTSA, 
2016a), and 10 out of the total 100 deaths caused by distracted driving (NHTSA, 2016d). 
It is important to include that human behavioral factors were responsible for 94% of total 
road crashes (Petridou & Moustaki, 2000). The traffic crash fatality trend in the U.S. per 
year from 2005 is presented in Figure 1 (NHTSA, 2016b). However, researchers have 
always predicted that educated and skilled drivers with advanced driver training are less 
prone to be involved in risky driving; hence, driver training results less traffic crashes 
(Roenker, Cissell, Ball, Wadley, & Edwards, 2003). Recent studies show that skilled 
drivers overestimate their capabilities and lean toward indecent driving behavior and 
habitual over speeding (Allan F. Williams & O'Neill, 1974). Nonetheless, many active 
safety features, i.e., automatic braking, lane departure warning and parking assistance, 
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have been installed in vehicles to assist human drivers and reduce human error-related 
traffic crashes. Since these safety features have been improved, drivers are assured of 
safe driving conditions and an ensured safe ride. Now researchers and automobile 
companies are progressing ahead to eliminate human drivers behind the vehicle wheels 
and bring computerization and automation into the overall transportation system 
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ecofriendly and personal mode of transportation. An autonomous vehicle can navigate 
itself on the roads and highways as well as in complex urban traffic scenarios—all 
without human intervention. The autonomous navigation can avert the crashes currently 
caused by human error. Fagnant and Kockelman predicted that autonomous vehicles can 
save more than 21,000 lives per year and eradicate more than four million crashes with a 
market penetration of 90% (Daniel J. Fagnant & Kara Kockelman, 2015). Furthermore, 
these advanced vehicles can provide mobility to new road user groups, i.e., children, the 
elderly and disabled, increase the transportation infrastructure capacity, save fuel and 
emit fewer pollutants. Autonomous vehicles could drastically change current land use 
practices by promoting more ride sharing, and reducing the need for parking spots.  
Vehicle windshields could be used as advertisement billboards! However, researchers 
predict that the consumers will initially consider these vehicles unsafe and will not spend 
money to purchase those (D. J. Fagnant & K. Kockelman, 2015). Meanwhile, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) AgeLab and the New England Motor Press 
Association (NEMPA) conducted a survey among nearly 3000 volunteers to explore 
people’s perspectives regarding autonomous vehicles and found that 48% of the 
participants would never choose the autonomous technology, while 29% do not trust 
these vehicles to any extent (Abraham et al., 2017). As a result, it is important to conduct 
a detailed analysis regarding the performance of autonomous vehicles to dispel people’s 
misconceptions concerning these vehicles, and to overcome this big stumbling block on 
the path of implementing these vehicles.    
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Background and Motivation   
The autonomous vehicle has been ameliorating human lives since 1935—in the 
pages of science fiction books. The concept of road automation was introduced at the 
New York World’s Fair in 1939 (Geddes & Bel, 1940). The first national automated 
driving program was started under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
(ISTEA), signed into law in 1991. Later, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency’s (DARPA’s) Grand Challenge was launched in 2005 to motivate the 
development of algorithms and technologies to develop the first autonomous vehicle that 
could navigate successfully a route of 132 miles without any driver intervention (Buehler, 
Iagnemma, & Eds, 2005). The hope was that the autonomous vehicle would be able to 
replace human drivers in dangerous situations and promised that in the future this vehicle 
would catalyze a revolutionary advancement in road and highway safety. Since then, 
many automotive and technology companies have raced to be the first to sell safe 
autonomous vehicles to consumers. However, these vehicles are equipped with highly 
tuned sensors and actuators, which are responsible for their autonomous navigation. 
Despite the many benefits of autonomous vehicles, these advanced components created a 
new set of challenges. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate these technologies before 
implementation and to identify strategies to integrate autonomous vehicles into current 
streams of traffic.  
Several states in the U.S. have started to sign new laws and regulations to promote 
the testing and development of autonomous vehicles. Nevada was the first state to pass 
legislation on autonomous vehicle testing on state roadways in June 2011. California was 
the second state with their legislation signed in September 2012 (Nowakowski, 
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Shladover, Chan, & Tan, 2015). California laws and regulations are applicable for a 
Level 3 automation system (conditional automation) and higher levels. Automation 
leveling is based on the definition of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). 
However, it was mandated that for testing on state roads and highways, each vehicle 
needs to be equipped with an independent event data recorder (EDR) to record all sensor 
data that can be gathered at least 30 seconds before a collision happens and to store that 
data at least for 3 years. Furthermore, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), who 
currently hold a permit to test their vehicles on state highways and freeways, must 
publicly share their test results (reports of incidents, i.e., crashes and disengagement of 
technology) with the California Department of Motor Vehicles (CA DMV). According to 
disengagement reports submitted to the CA DMV, various non-autonomous vehicles 
driven by human drivers were the primary cause for a significant number of incidents 
(Delphi, 2016; Google, 2016; Mercedes-Benz, 2016; Nissan, 2016; Volkswagen, 2016). 
Table 1 presents a summary of crashes from recent reports. These reports also include 
disengagement incidents in which the operator disengages autonomous driving and 
controls the vehicle manually. About 2,700 disengagements were reported because of 
unexpected autonomous driving situations such as potholes, poor lane markings, 
construction zones, and adverse road weather conditions (Fingas, 9 May 2015; 
Sorokanich, 30 August 2014; Vincent, 13 January 2016). In addition, various hardware 
and software systems responsible for autonomous driving are prone to disruptions and/or 
hacking. Researchers recently developed a system consisting of low-power lasers and a 
pulse generator that can mislead autonomous vehicle sensors, such as LIDAR into seeing 
objects where none exist (Harris, 4 Sep 2015). Researchers also demonstrated that 
7 
 
hackers could remotely take over the control of autonomous vehicle brakes, accelerators, 
and other critical safety components (Simonite, 2016). Other researchers recently found 
an  algorithm for autonomous vehicles, which was used to detect objects and was subject 
to error when traffic signs were camouflaged with stickers, graffiti or art (Evtimov et al., 
2017). The researchers examined the algorithm by putting stickers on stop signs and 
observed that the vehicle misread the sign as a “45 mile per hour” speed limit sign. 
Moreover, a fatal crash occurred on a state highway in Florida on May 7, 2016 due to 
vehicular sensors failing to detect a white tractor-trailer while driving in autopilot mode. 
This report was issued in a preliminary investigations (Klein, 2016). However, the 
manufacturing company claimed that the vehicular system was designed to assist the 
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Potential risks during the transition phase (i.e., from conventional vehicles to 
100% autonomous vehicles in the transportation system), as well as the vulnerability of 
other vehicular and communication technologies, could disrupt the mass deployment of 
autonomous vehicles on our roads. However, it is essential to conduct a thorough risk 
analysis of autonomous vehicles. Since the autonomous vehicle is equipped with 
hundreds of sensors, actuators, and communication devices to navigate autonomously, 
the reliability of these sensors must be evaluated before mass deployment. Severe traffic 
crashes may cause and result in fatalities and property losses if the advanced autonomous 
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vehicle navigation sensors are not fully developed. This risk analysis needs to be 
designed to explore the root causes of potential failures of autonomous vehicles and 
identify the chain of events that could lead to the failure of system integrity. The 
comprehensive risk analysis results are needed to guide policymakers to support the 
deployment of these advanced vehicles into the large US transportation grid.  
Research Objectives  
As technology evolves, and continues to evolve each day, the apparent risks 
associated with these new technologies begin to multiply making the risk analysis process 
more important than ever. Risk analysis is utilized to identify the potential hazardous 
sources and accident scenarios and to assess the potential impact these can have on 
human, environmental, and technological targets. It could become a valuable tool to help 
risk managers reduce potential threats and policymakers to develop a management and 
maintenances framework, which a manufacture must follow to ensure public safety. In 
this thesis research, a comprehensive risk analysis was conducted to identify the threats 
associated with autonomous vehicles. Risk analysis is a potential source of novel 
database information; furthermore, it can guide both professionals and policymakers in 
their acceptance and regulation of the policies and regulations needed for autonomous 
vehicle mass deployment. A probabilistic fault-tree analysis tool is used to identify 
potential risks. Furthermore, it is also necessary to identify strategies to integrate 
autonomous vehicles into current streams of traffic, as the number of autonomous 
vehicles will be low at the initial phase. So, this research focuses on the transition phase 
in which autonomous vehicles will become a part of the current traffic mix of 
conventional vehicles.  
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The objectives of autonomous vehicle risk analysis are to:    
1) Develop the hierarchical sequence of events that may result in the failure of an 
autonomous vehicle or the infrastructure it depends on, in the form of a fault tree, 
2) identify shortest routes (i.e., minimal cut sets of the developed fault trees) leading 
to overall autonomous vehicle system failures and prioritize them based on the 
failure probabilities of basic event occurrences, and 
3) simulate a microscopic traffic model and investigate the impact of autonomous 
vehicle failures on the efficiency of overall transportation infrastructures. 
Notably, an autonomous vehicle is represented as equipped with Level 4 and Level 5 
automation systems as defined by the SAE (high and full automation). Furthermore, only 
an autonomous passenger car or a similar vehicle is considered here. Transit trucks or 
other types of on- or off-the-road vehicles are not included. 
Organization of Thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
research, background and motivation behind the research. The objectives of the research 
are also briefly discussed in this chapter. A thorough literature review on autonomous 
vehicle systems, risk analysis and its applications, as well as fault tree methods are 
presented in the second chapter. The detailed methodology is described in the third 
chapter. The fourth chapter explores the three phases of autonomous vehicle risk analysis 
to evaluate the reliability of the integration of an automated navigation system. The three 
phases are: risk identification, risk estimation and risk hierarchization. Then, the results 
of fault tree analysis are compared and validated with real-world data collected from the 
California Department of Motor Vehicles (CA DMV). The fifth chapter presents the 
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Delphi survey structure and the results of the survey. A statistical method called 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance W is used to analyze survey results. The algorithm 
of autonomous vehicle navigation is presented in chapter six. A traffic network is 
simulated using a microscopic traffic simulation platform and then calibrated. This 
simulation model is evaluated with different autonomous vehicle market penetration 
levels. Finally, concluding remarks along with recommendations and future directions are 
presented in chapter seven. All the codes to run autonomous vehicle simulation on a 






Autonomous vehicles have the potential to eliminate traffic accidents due to human 
error thereby providing a safe and sustainable transportation system. However, a fully 
developed autonomous vehicle has not become a reality yet. Even a small misjudgment in 
autonomous navigation could lead to highly devastating crashes, which could result in 
both fatalities and property loss. So, a comprehensive risk analysis of autonomous 
vehicles is required before their mass deployment on roads and highways. Several 
researchers have developed a preliminary risk analysis model of autonomous vehicles. 
Different autonomous vehicle sub-systems and/ or a few transportation infrastructure 
components were considered in those studies; however, weather, other road users (non-
autonomous drivers, cyclists, pedestrians, etc.) and road surface conditions were not 
included. As far as the author knows, the fault-tree based risk analysis of autonomous 
vehicles in mixed traffic streams considering both vehicular components and 
infrastructure components has not been conducted yet. This chapter is organized as 
follows:  
 Autonomous Vehicles: This section summarizes the overall system integration of 
vehicular components used for autonomous navigation. The summary of vehicular 
components will help identify the potential risks of autonomous vehicles.  
 Risk Analysis: This section reviews the risk analysis phases, along with analysis 
elements. Later on, the risk analysis techniques will be classified into two classes. 
Fault tree method, one of the risk analysis methods, is also explained briefly in this 
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section, as the author will use this technique to estimate the overall failure rate of 
autonomous vehicles.  
 Risk Analysis of Autonomous Vehicles: Finally, the proposed risk analysis methods 
in different studies will be summarized. These methods will be divided into three 
separate classes based on their study structures.   
Autonomous Vehicle  
The concept of an intelligent transportation system has been a subliminal 
possibility for many futurists since the 1930s. However, the subliminal is finally 
becoming a reality as Japan, U.S. and Europe focus on large-scale integration and 
deployment of their individual ITS programs. Connected vehicles, equipped with 
communication devices and within a connected infrastructure environment, could collect 
previously unobtainable traffic data and can also share that information with other 
connected vehicles and monitoring units simultaneously. This communication between 
vehicles and infrastructure has received a great deal of attention since the 1960s. 
Transportation officials and engineers have encouraged designers to create higher levels 
of safety and mobility improvements on the roadways for more than 50 years. The 
connected infrastructure communication with autonomous vehicles and technologies like 
global positioning systems (GPSs), drones, and other monitoring devices seem to have 
unlimited expected benefits. One benefit could come from  the implementation of fully 
autonomous vehicles with the ability to perceive its environment, make route selections, 
and drive by itself without any human involvement or any occupants at all (Richard 








The exponential growth of processor speeds within the last 30 years and the 
availability of feasible technologies have enabled transportation engineers to focus on 
vision-based vehicles detection for driver assistance over last decade. Figure 2 shows 
different functional components of autonomous vehicles along with their specific tasks. 
Planning generates potential trajectories for an autonomous vehicle, based on the origin 
and destination chosen by the passengers. Driver behaviors will be considered while 
selecting routes on previously loaded maps. Position recognition or sensing detects the 
surrounding objects, other road users, transportation infrastructure components, and also 
estimates current positions, attitude, velocity and acceleration. Then, vehicles will 
optimize and establish safe paths along with other objects to complete a safe trip. Finally, 
the vehicular control will perform a control movement and the vehicle will be driven to 
the next position on its trajectories.   
Radar-based (S. Park, T. Kim, S. Kang, & Heon, 2003), laser-based (Chieh-Chih, 
Thorpe, & Suppe, 2003), (John Hancock et al., 1997) and acoustic-based (Chellappa, 
Gang, & Qinfen, 2004) approaches are being used for vehicle detection, where the system 
doesn’t require powerful computing algorithms and processing units. A camera-based 
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vision system, which requires fast processing speed and high-capacity data storage, can 
represent a nearly 360
 
° field of view. This allows a greater handling efficiency when 
entering a curves, overtaking other vehicles, and early recognition of traffic signals and 
signs as well as dedicated lanes and bikes or pedestrians (Sun, Bebis, & Miller, 2006). 
Level of automation. Based on the level of vehicle versus human control, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has specified five levels of 
automation (Blanco et al., 2015). The goal of these classifications is to provide a common 
terminology for automated driving. However, SAE International also developed another 
harmonized classification system for the same purpose. As the level of automation 
increases, the responsibility of the nonautonomous driver shifts from driving to 
supervisory tasks. A brief description of the NHTSA autonomous vehicle classifications 
is given below. 
Level 0 (no automation). Over the duration of the journey, the non-autonomous 
driver solely controls the vehicle (brake, steering, throttle, and motive power), and he or 
she is responsible for the safe operation of the vehicle. A vehicle may have certain level 
of driver assistance and support systems (for example: lane departure warning, blind spot 
warning, etc.). These support systems can provide warnings as well as automated 
secondary control, like wipers, headlights, hazard lights, etc., but they do not have control 
over steering, braking, or throttle.  
Level 1 (function specific automation). At this level, one or more control specific 
control functions are integrated into the vehicle system, although the driver controls the 
overall navigations and motions. The vehicle can cede the authority of the driver and add 
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certain levels of control in crash-imminent situations, for example dynamic brake support 
in emergencies.  
Level 2 (combined function automation). Automation of at least two primary 
control functions is involved in this level to release the driver’s responsibilities over the 
control of those functions. However, the driver is still expected to take over responsibility 
if those assigned controls are perceived to compromise the vehicle’s safe operation due to 
unexpected problems on the roadways.  
Level 3 (limited self-driving automation). The driver is relieved from the control 
of all safety critical functions, although he or she is expected to take over the control 
occasionally, but within a sufficiently comfortable transition time.  
Level 4 (full self-driving automation). The vehicle can navigate, perform all 
driving control functions, and monitor the roadway for an entire trip without any 
intervention of the human driver.  
On the other hand, there are six levels of automation from “No Automation” to 
“Full Automation” identified in SAE classification. The comparison between NHTSA 









It should be noted that this study considers only the Level 4 passenger car for 
analysis, and this does not include transit or other type of on- or off-the-road vehicles, i.e. 
trucks, buses, farm vehicles. 
System disintegration. To identify the potential risks related to a system, the first 
step is to divide the whole system into basic components. The analysis of technological 
developments installed in autonomous vehicles could be a way to figure out the sensitive 
components of these vehicles, which would eventually lead to risk identification. The 
automotive features which made autonomous vehicles safer than the conventional 
vehicles are discussed here.  
Intelligent adaptive cruise control system. Even though road accidents still occur 
every day with major economic losses to the society, but statistic shows that numbers of 
fatalities in road accidents are decreasing. There were 1.11 fatalities per 100 million 
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vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in 2010. This number was 1.53 in 2000 (Congress, 2013). 
Rear-end collisions were responsible for approximately 1.8 million crashes, which 
resulted in 1,570 fatalities in 1998 (Persson, Botling, Hesslow, & Johansson, 1999). 
Moreover, maximum use of highway capacity would be achievable if vehicles could run 
closely without causing crashes at the posted highway speed (Swaroop & Huandra, 1998; 
Swaropp & Rajagopal, 1999). But this constant spacing platoon could only stabilize if 
vehicles are equipped with an adaptive cruise control system (ACC). This system 
automatically controls the throttle and/or the brake to adjust the vehicle velocity and 
maintain a predetermined safe distance from the following vehicle. On-board installed 
sensors, like RADAR and LIDAR, etc., measure the distances between two successive 
vehicles.  
A  maximum traffic flow of more than 4200 vehicles/hour per each lane when all 
vehicles are equipped with this driving assistance system could be achievable 
(VanderWerf, Shladover, Miller, & Kourjanskaia, January 2002), while manual driving 
permits around 2000 vehicles/hour (P. Ryus, L. Elefteriadou, R. G. Dowling, & Ostrom, 
2011). To evaluate the probability of collision between vehicles, researchers used Monte 
Carlo simulations and found that ACC significantly reduces collision probability 
(Touran, Brackstone, & McDonald, May 1999). 
Some automaker companies introduced ACC in their cars at the beginning of the 
21st century. Researchers found that 1.1 to 10.7% fuel consumption could be reduced by 
using this driver assistant. Moreover, implementation of safer roadways would be 
applicable through adopting this system (D. Godbole, R. Sengupta, J. Misener, N. 
Kourjanskaia, & J.B.  Michael, January 1998; W.G. Najm & A.L. Burgett, 1997). A 60% 
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reduction in air pollution from transportation sectors would be possible if 10 percent of 
vehicles were equipped with the ACC (Bose & Ioannou, 2001). It requires no road 
infrastructure modification to work effectively, so this driver assistant system is available 
for immediate use (T. Chira-Chavala & S.M. Yoo, 1994). Researchers implemented 
human following behavior based on fuzzy logic or neuro-controllers to train ACC 
spacing adjustments (Germann & Isermann, 1995). However, nonlinear mathematical 
control models like sliding mode control (Gerdes & Hedrick, 1997) and optimal dynamic 
back-stepping control (X. Lu, Shladover, & Hedrick, June 2001) have been used in 
deriving the desired acceleration for the string stability of the expected vehicle platoon. 
Automotive collision avoidance/ warning system. Loss of control causes at least 
9 percent of all car crashes in the U.S. every year ("National Motor Vehicle Crash 
Causation Survey," July 2008). Statistics shows that the drivers’ delay in recognizing or 
judging a “dangerous” situation is responsible for a large number of road accidents. 
When it is possible to overcome human driver limitations by automating some parts of 
driving tasks, this type of accident could be eliminated. Researchers have developed one 
driving assistance system, called the collision avoidance system which requires a 
RADAR sensor installed at the front of the vehicle. This sensory system could perceive a 
dangerous situation based on the collection of robust and reliable data, which can be 
utilized to estimate the time of collision (TTC). If the time to collision at a current speed 
is lower than the threshold value, then the system automatically controls the car to brake 
and/or steer from an imminent collision. It was found that more than 50% of rear end 
collisions could be avoided though collision avoidance system ("Report to Congress on 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ITS Program," January 1997) and 
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90% of accidents could be prevented with one second of warning time provided to a 
driver (Woll, 1997). 
The collision avoidance system first warns the driver when the distance between 
successive vehicles becomes smaller than the warning distance, and in the more critical 
situation it brakes automatically when this distance drops to less than the braking 
distance. Honda and Mazda presented a model to determine and scale the warning and 
braking distance according to drivers’ preferences based on different environments 
(Seiler, Song, & Hedrick, 1998). Later a model was developed to calculate the brake 
timing for rear end collision warnings (B. Wilson, 2001). Other researchers also 
eventually developed another nonlinear model, which could derive road tire friction 
(Kyongsu & Jintai, 2001; Yi, Woo, Kim, & Lee, March 1999). This model was further 
updated to calculate tire road friction and scale critical distances (Seiler et al., 1998). 
Researchers also proposed and designed a neural network to estimate the collision 
avoided path (Eskandarian & Thiriez, September 1998). 
Lane departure warning. A considerable portion of road accidents are caused by 
a temporary and involuntary fading of a driver’s vision, which can be caused by sleep 
deprivation, fatigue, using mobile phone, chatting, or some other diversion, which leads 
the vehicle to leave its designated lane. In the U.S., about 11% of vehicles that fail to stay 
in the proper lane cause vehicle crashes ("National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation 
Survey," July 2008). A machine vision system, called the lane departure warning system, 
could improve road safety by preventing a vehicle’s unintentional deviation from the 
center of its traveling lane. Different sensors have been researched to perform lane 
departure warning, including but not limited to LIDAR, camera, and GPS devices. In 
21 
 
case of camera vision-based system, a camera (or multiple cameras) installed on-board 
visualize the solid and striped markings of the road ahead and then the steering is 
adjusted to keep the vehicle in the center of the lane.   
Researchers used a temporal filter for noise reduction and road marking detecting 
to diagnose road edges (Beucher & Bilodeau, 1994; Yu, Beucher, & Bilodeau, 1992). 
Although the detected road edges are typically irregular and rough, this model still 
requires relatively high computational costs. Another method of lane detection depends 
on the top view images captured by camera vision, which are compared with the world 
coordinate of lane edges based on online computation (Bertozzi & Broggi, 1998; 
Pomerleau, 1995). Deformable mathematical road models are suggested to detach road 
boundaries based on a linear model which could not provide enough accurate results. 
Splines or a parabolic model are options, but these models are sensitive to noises 
(Enkelmann, Struck, & Geisler, 1995; Risack, Mohler, & Enkelmann, 2000). Later 
researchers developed a model based on particle filtering and multiple cues to be efficient 
under a variety of conditions like shadows, cloudy days, and rain, but the model could 
also be applicable to the curved sections of the roadway (Apostoloff & Zelinsky, 2003). 
An edge distribution function (EDF) was proposed by (J. Lee, 2002) and later modified 
by (Fardi, Scheunert, Cramer, & Wanielik, 2003)  through a boundary pixel extractor to 
detect curved roads with dashed lane markings. Recently a linear-parabolic lane boundary 
model was proposed where a linear model was designed to fit the adjacent straight 
section, and a quadratic function was used to detect incoming curves, even in the 
presence of shadows and different lighting conditions (Jung & Kelber, 2004). 
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Intersection collision avoidance system. Recent studies show that 36% of all road 
accidents in the U.S. occur due to intersection collisions ("National Motor Vehicle Crash 
Causation Survey," July 2008). In 2004, signal and stop sign intersection crashes are 
responsible for $7.9 billion in economic losses (W.G. Najm, J.D. Smith, & M. 
Yanagisawa, 2007). To avoid this type of collision, an intersection collision avoidance 
system was designed and developed for predicting driver behaviors at stop sign- and 
signal-controlled intersections. This new system enables a vehicle to handle emergency 
intersection problems safely. The vision-based system estimates the time to collision 
(TTC) in any type of traffic rule violation and controls the speed and acceleration in real 
time to avoid crashes. However, the DSRC (dedicated short-range communication) 
system could be used to allocate transmission windows to vehicles approaching an 
intersection, which starts with generating a poll request to inquire about their maneuver 
status; then, sends safety messages to ensure safe intersection movements (Rawashdeh & 
Mahmud, 2008). Inter-vehicular communication leads to a more flexible method for this 
information communication where all vehicles entering the intersection broadcast their 
locations with direction, speed and destination (Dogan et al., 2004). Later real time 
infrastructure communication using telematics and wireless sensor network is proposed to 
supply base stations with the necessary information for collision prediction and 
avoidance options (Basma, Tachwali, & Refai, 2011). Magnetic sensors (Kyungbok, Jae 
Jun, & Dohyun, 2007), the camera vision method (Atev, Masoud, Janardan, & 
Papanikolopoulos, 2005), radar (Menon, Gorjestani, Shankwitz, & Donath, 2004) and a 
combination of loop detector and radar systems (Ashkan Sharafsaleh & Chan, November 
6-10, 2005) are used as wireless sensors in different research methodologies. 
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Electronic stability control. Electronic stability control (ESC) systems are another 
breakthrough driving assistant technology used to monitor the speed of each wheel, the 
steering wheel angle, yaw rate and lateral acceleration comprising sensors, brakes, the 
engine control module and a microcomputer. This on-board car safety system is designed 
to enhance safe driving through improving vehicles’ lateral stability and assisting drivers 
in critical situations or under unfavorable conditions (rain, snow, etc.). When sensor data 
detect an emergency, the ESC system applies the brakes to individual wheels and 
possibly reduces the engine torque so as not to lose the control of the vehicles. This 
system could reduce the number of accidents due to driver error and loss of control. 22 
percent of road accidents, which are caused due to running off the edge of the road or a 
loss of control, could be avoided by ESC ("National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation 
Survey," July 2008). A Swedish research team showed that ESC could reduce from 20% 
to 40% of crashes on wet surfaces or surfaces covered by snow or ice (Tingvall, Krafft, 
Kullgren, & Lie, May 19-22, 2003). 
Earlier ESC was treated as an optional driving assistance system on European-
U.S. luxury cars. In 1995 the ESC system was first introduced in Europe and later 
appeared in the U.S. market (Memmer, 2001). Later Audi, Ford, General Motors, Toyota, 
BMW and Mercedes incorporated this technology into their cars. This system includes 
sensor offset compensation, sensor signal filtering and processing, sensor plausibility, 
active wheel lift detection and software enhancement of brake hydraulics to achieve 
vehicle stability control (Eric Fenaux & Jeremy Buisson, 2007). 
A simple model called the β-method was developed to calculate the sideslip angle 
during traffic maneuvers (Shibahata, Shimada, & Tomari, 1993). By regulating the 
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engine’s torque and wheel brake pressure using traction control components another 
system was used to minimize the error and help the driver to keep the car under control 
(van Zanten, Erhardt, & Pfaff, 1995). An on-line sensor monitoring method using sensors 
in the ESC system was developed, implemented and produced in large volumes (Fennel 
& Ding, 2000). Later a dynamic model was built and verified using MATLAB and 
Simulink (Wang & Xue, 2004). A combination of anti-braking and a traction control 
system was used to derive another dynamic model with control logic for active yaw 
control (Y. Jia, J. Song, & Sun, 2004). The developed fuzzy logic PID controller is 
embedded in the modern ESC system to achieve more reliability (Liangmo Wang, Li 
Tan, Li-hua An, Zhi-lin Wu, & Li, 2012). 
Pedestrian detection system. Pedestrian detection is a challenging problem in a 
vision-based intelligent transportation system using cameras and RADARs installed on 
fast moving vehicles. Normally, a candidate selection mechanism is used to solve this 
pedestrian recognition problem in vision based system, which is done by performing 
object segmentation on either a 3-D scene or 2-D image plane, (Alonso et al., 2007). 
However, to ensure a low false negative ratio, this system requires yielding lots of 
candidate per frame and assumes a flat terrain, which causes loss of depth of scene. This 
system could be successful with less computational cost. A stereo vision system can 
overcome these problems, but the solution would entail high computational cost and a 
dynamic calibration model. Infrared images (Fardi, Schuenert, & Wanielik, 2005; 
Fengliang & Fujimura, 2002) and infrared stereo (Bertozzi, Broggi, Lasagni, & Rose, 
2005) have also been applied in different research  efforts to provide better visibility at 
night and during adverse weather conditions. 
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Researchers mostly use shape analysis to detect pedestrians in real traffic 
scenarios. Also some other techniques like vertical linear feature with human template 
(Bertozzi et al., 2003), hierarchical shape templates on Chamfer distance (Gavrila, 
Giebel, & Munder, 2004), Haar wavelet representation (Mohan, Papageorgiou, & Poggio, 
2001), probabilistic human template (Nanda & Davis, 2002), sparse Gabor filters and 
support vector machines (Hong, Nanning, & Junjie, 2005), graph kernels (Suard, Guigue, 
Rakotomamonjy, & Benshrair, 2005), and motion analysis (Franke & Heinrich, 2002) 
have been considered for pedestrian detection in different research papers. The fast and 
robust algorithm of neural networks has been successfully applied to detect pedestrians 
and roads in cluttered scenes using a pair of moving cameras (Liang & Thorpe, 1999; 
Szarvas, Yoshizawa, Yamamoto, & Ogata, 2005). 
Vehicular sensors for automation. In the previous section, automotive features 
are used to track down the necessary sensors and components of autonomous vehicles. 
These sensors have to work smoothly to maintain the autonomous movements of these 
vehicles; consequently, the failure of one sensor could lead to the failure of the whole 
system unless there is a backup plan to recover the defective components immediately 
and automatically. The analysis of the potential risks for each sensor and its reliability as 
part of the whole system are required to ensure safe transportation systems. To identify 
these preliminary risks, a fault tree for autonomous vehicles was developed and analyzed 
to determine system availability or reliability rate (Duran, Robinson, Kornecki, & 




LIDAR. LIDAR (light detection and ranging) is a remote sensing technology. Its 
uses are amazingly varied especially since its primary objective is to collect 3D 
information and to use light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure different distances 
from its airborne location to earth. LIDAR’s role in the autonomous vehicle operation is 
to collect kinematic information about the vehicle and physical information about its 
surroundings, The LIDAR optical sensor is installed on the hood of autonomous car. It 
includes a laser, lens filter, receiver, power regulator, rotating mirror, and onboard 
processor. The autonomous car LIDAR system is a combination of synchronizing 
hardware, which includes precision motors and position encoders, as well as an onboard 
processing unit that detects the objects and produces both 2D and 3D point clouds. The 
processing unit must be placed at a high clearance location from the ground; moreover, 
protective measures are needed to protect the unit from foreign object impact, shock or 
vibration resulting from crashes or rough terrain navigation, which could lead to failure 
of the system.  
High resolution 3D LIDAR could be useful for up to a 50-meter range with 
efficient operation in the shadows and different lighting conditions (Fishman, 1996). A 
complex model of roads (Box & Wilson, 1954), precise localization system using GPS 
and/or an internal measurement unit (IMU) (Au & L.Beck, 2001; Bucher & Bourgund, 
1990) are synchronized with the LIDAR system in many research projects for 
autonomous driving systems. Other researchers combined LIDAR and computer based 
vision technology for this purpose (Gavrila, 2001).   
RADAR sensor technology. Radio waves are transmitted into the environment to 
scatter back information on obstacles around the vehicle and increases awareness of other 
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vehicles ahead and behind. This sensor keeps a digital eye on other cars and instructs the 
autonomous car to speed up or slow down depending on the behavior of other drivers. It 
also assists in the automotive parking feature.  
Camera. Due to the presence of visual cues and landmarks, the camera-based 
vision system is used in a variety of research endeavors (Fuke & Krotkov, 1996). 
Cameras are required in the intelligent transportation system for environment sensing to 
recognize obstacles with respect to the autonomous vehicle’s location and speed. Two-
dimensional images using a single camera or 3D maps using dual camera could 
stereoscopically pinpoint the available space for autonomous movements of the vehicle. 
These images or maps from the camera vision system are used to extract quantitative 
information from the scenes, to detect obstacles or to track the targets. The images are 
segmented into a certain number of pixels. Each pixel is processed and stored, which 
requires high computational speed and high memory space.  
Global positioning system. The main sensor used for acquiring navigation and 
positioning of the autonomous car is the Global Positioning System (GPS) which 
provides information with one-centimeter precision. To navigate the vehicles 
autonomously the GPS, with the help of sensors, creates precise maps of the roadway and 
drives that in the exact direction. This GPS based route tracking could also detect other 
vehicles on the same roadway and show their exact position on the same scene, as each 
vehicle has a GPS receiver (Goel, Dedeoglu, Roumeliotis, & Sukhatme, 2000). Due to 
signal disturbance and other interference from the atmosphere the position estimated 
using a GPS may be off by several meters. Also, tall buildings obstruct the satellite 
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signal. Fuzzy variables and rules are used to model the guidance system and correct the 
computed trajectory (Y. C. Lee, June 1986).  
Wheel encoder. The wheel encoder is used to keep track of an autonomous car’s 
direction, speed and the distance a wheel travels. It could be helpful for precise 
movement as it could allow the vehicles to turn exact angles or move exact distances. It 
proves its high efficiency in planar environment as a dead-reckoning sensor, but is not 
applicable when there is significant deviation from planar motion (Lapp & Powers, 
1977). This sensor could assist for reverse parking through navigating into a tight parking 
spot when the car is engaged in reverse gear.  
A brief info-graphics showing the significance of different autonomous vehicle 
components and their functions are presented in Figure 4. Also, a summary review on 
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Risk Analysis  
The development of risk management processes has become a topic of treat 
concern recently as industries and businesses worldwide attempt to overcome potential 
threats and ensure the safety of their systems. This risk analysis is used in many different 
fields, including but not limited to: industrial plant design (C. Alonso, 1998), construction 
project managements (Chapman, 1997; Ross & Donald, 1995), toxic goods transport 
(Gadd, Leeming, & Riley, 1998; Tiemessen & Zweeden, 1998), hazardous site 
management performance (Hurst, 1996), medical records and management (Bogen, 1990) 
as well as software management (Boehm, 1991). In these risk analysis approaches, the 
dynamic behavior of a system is considered because the active components can be 
sources of failure and unexecuted fault prevention will result in failure (S. Yacoub, 
November 1999). 
Phases of risk analysis. Risk analysis can be performed at various development 
phases and can guide future research for better safety in this field. There are three main 
phases researchers consider in risk analysis methodologies (D. White, 1995). They are: 
- Risk identification 
- Risk estimation 
- Risk hierarchization 
Risk identification consists of two interconnected tasks, 1) disassembling the 
whole system into small parts to make the process easier to understand and 2) examining 
the behavior of those small parts. Components can range from a simple sensor, an 
actuator, or the integration platform and database system to links between infrastructures 
and vehicles. Once the components are identified, the failure rate of each vehicle part 
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used for automation is determined to describe and quantify the risks related to the whole 
system. Later in the second phase, these probabilistic failure values will help autonomous 
vehicle design and maintenance engineers to estimate the significance of these risks as a 
whole system and determine the system reliability. The ranking of these failure events 
obtained through all the work completed up to this point is the aim of the last phase, 
which is hierarchization. This phase detects the shortest possible route(s) to lead the top 
event failure.  
Elements of risk analysis. The three phases relate to each other by three elements 
which are essential to carrying out the risk analysis. They are available input data, 
expected output data, and selected method. After risk identification, the potential failure 
probabilities concerning the studied autonomous vehicles system are collected. There are 
seven classes of input data used by different researchers, which are: 
[1] Plans or diagrams: The details of industry floor plans, i.e., production sites and 
storage units are used in this class.    
[2] Process and reactions: Mechanical and chemical features of the system, operation 
requirements and kinetic parameters are considered as process and reaction 
inputs.   
[3] Substances: Physical and chemical properties of materials, material quantities and 
their toxicological information are used as substance inputs.     
[4] Probability and frequency: System reliability, failure types, frequency of failure 
and time dependent failure rates are used as probability and frequency input data.  
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[5] Policy and management: Safety rules and regulations are included as an input 
model in this type of fault tree; examples could include but are not limited to: 
transport safety requirements, operational safety and safety management.   
[6] Environment: Topological data and surrounding information are used as input 
data in this class.  
[7] Text and historical knowledge: Historical information and previous analysis 
results are included in this input class.  
Including recommendations as an output of risk analysis, the outputs could be 
classified into four categories. They are:  
1) Management: The outputs of this category are recommendations, modifications 
and updated operational procedures.   
2) Lists: The lists of hazards, domino effects, errors, failure and damages, failure 
causes, critical activities and accident scenarios are the outputs.   
3) Probabilistic: The system failure rates, system reliability performances and 
accident frequencies are generated as the results.   
4) Hierarchization: The severity, system criticality, performance index and 
organization index are considered as the outcomes of risk analysis.  
The next step is the selection of a method, where there are two types of methods. 
These types could be divided into three categories based on the approach selection (J. 
Tixier, G. Dusserre, O. Salvi, & Gaston, July 2000). They are: 
- Qualitative: deterministic approach, probabilistic approach and combination of 
deterministic and probabilistic approach 
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- Quantitative: deterministic approach, probabilistic approach and combination of 
deterministic and probabilistic approach 
The consequences and their products, the equipment and quantification of impacts 
on human, equipment and environment are considered in deterministic approach. The 
deterministic approach can be performed qualitatively and quantitatively. On the other 
hand, the frequency of hazardous situations and potential occurrence of those hazards is 
considered in probabilistic approach. Similarly, this probabilistic approach can be 
conducted qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Classification of risk analysis techniques. There are numerous techniques and 
methods used in risk analysis. However, risk analysis techniques can be classified into 
two types (J. Tixier et al., July 2000). They are:  
1) Holistic Techniques: In this category, risk analysis techniques consider the 
multiple partial views of the problem’s environment. A systematic upward movement is 
carried out here to analyze the overall risk probability of the system. Thus, the risk 
probabilities study can include: risk compensation theory, root cause analysis, risk 
homeostasis theory, etc.    
2) Reductionist Techniques: This category breaks down the overall system into 
simplest parts and estimates the impact of those parts on the overall risk analysis of the 
system. Fault tree analysis, cost benefit analysis, ontology-based analysis, Monte Carlo 




The risk analysis methods are plotted in Figure 5, a two-axis figure, based on their 
classifications and frequency of use. This figure suggests that reductionist methods are 





Figure 5. Classification of risk analysis methods:  cost benefit analysis (CBA), fault tree 
analysis (FTA), stability analysis (SA), risk benefit analysis (RBA), Monte Carlo 
simulation (MCS), failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), common mode common 
cause (CMCC),  root cause analysis (RCA),  risk compensation theory (RCT),and risk 




Risk Analysis of Autonomous Vehicles  
Risk analysis of autonomous vehicles identifies undesirable events and sequences 
of events leading to autonomous navigation failure, which could lead to road crashes, 
passenger fatalities, pedestrian injuries, vehicle damage, and external property damage. 
Researchers followed different paths to assess the potential risks related to autonomous 
vehicles. Risk analysis methods utilized for estimating the success rates of autonomous 
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navigation can be categorized into three different classes. They are: i) situation based 
analysis, ii) ontology based analysis and iii) fault tree based analysis.  
Situation-based risk analysis method. The process of analyzing newly identified 
risks or threats based on the solution of similar previous problems is called the situation-
based risk analysis method. It is assumed that a complex driving situation can be reported 
by entities, their attributes, and their connections among each other. In this method, 
driving situations are described as traffic-oriented factors collected over temporal and 
spacious patterns. A baseline model is developed to store the prior knowledge of relevant 
situation-specific concepts as templates. The checklists of risk and their factors are stored 
based on integration of background knowledge, and they describe complex risk situations 
in a comprehensive way. Then, the risk identification is carried out as an ongoing risk 
management task to accomplish the success of an endeavor. Situation-based risk 
assessment method can be grouped into five steps. They are:  
(i) Specification of risks related to autonomous navigation: Risk situations are defined by 
using the entities and their inter-relationships based on expert background knowledge of 
previously explored incidents. The relational dependencies need to be evaluated. The 
collision between the autonomous vehicle and other road users could be an example of 
identified risk situations in road surrounding environment.  
(ii) Definition of model concepts: After identification of risk situations, the attributes and 
their inter-relationships must be defined using object-oriented probabilistic relational 
language. For example, the risk probability of collision with other road users can be 
defined as a function of their distances and relative velocities.  
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(iii) Construction of world model: The identified risk situations are then transformed into 
a world model to represent the actual state of the world in terms of entities and 
relationships.  
(iv) Construction of probabilistic network: A graphical network of probabilistic attributes 
and their casual dependencies is generated to reason about the current driving situations.  
(v) Assessment of current situation: In this final step, the expected inferences are defined 
and addressed based on the developed probability distribution.  
The identification of risks related to autonomous vehicles and the reasoning 
behind driving situations have been prioritized by researchers in previous years. To 
estimate the domain of driving situations, Monte Carlo  simulations were used in the case 
of rear-end collisions (Hillenbrand & Kroschel, 2006). Hidden Markov models (HMMs) 
were utilized to model complex situations in (Meyer-Delius, Plagemann, & Burgard, 
2009), although a new HMM had to be assigned for each situation. Laugier et al. updated 
the risk analysis for simple traffic scenarios by combining the Hidden Markov Model and 
Gaussian Process Model (D. White, 1995). The later use of Markov logic networks were 
improved to describe domains as interconnected objects for driver assistance systems and 
specified the model as more compact and thus modular (Stiller, Kammel, & Lulcheva, 
2008). Researchers also deployed a knowledge-based risk analysis framework to develop 
simple risk patterns for autonomous vehicles using data collected by vehicle sensors. 
Then, risk values were evaluated (Bogen, 1990; Swaropp & Rajagopal, 1999; 
VanderWerf et al., January 2002). Other external sensors like RADAR (Jocoy & Knight, 
1998), GPS position sensors (Miller & Qingfeng, 2002), wireless communication (Jihua 
& Han-Shue, 2006) and cameras (Amditis et al., 2010) were used to predict collisions 
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and warn the driver in case of threats. Collision risks were also predicted based on 
intersections of future trajectories, and different shapes of overlapping regions considered 
in different studies.  These risks were identified by sets of points (Batz, Watson, & 
Beyerer, 2009), circles (Ammoun & Nashashibi, 2009), polygons (Broadhurst, Baker, & 
Kanade, 2005), etc. Then risk probabilities were estimated using the percentage of 
overlap between the trajectories. Also to generate better predictions of vehicle trajectories 
on curved roads, the differentiable continuous curves were adopted in (Katrakazas, 
Quddus, Chen, & Deka, 2015). 
Physical parameters of vehicles were considered for developing a risk assessment 
platform for safe motion planning (D. White, 1995). In (J. D. Lee, M. L. Ries, D. V. 
McGehee, & Brown, 2000), traffic situations affecting one road user were broke down 
into sets of attributes, which were linked using a Bayesian network. However, these sets 
were separated from each other, and the separation created issues while propagating the 
effect from one set to another. Some other researchers allowed the interactions between 
the sets of attributes to resolve this problem.  Although Vacek et al. developed a model 
using situation-based reasoning, their model could fail due to an excessive number of 
situations in the model base (Vacek, Gindele, Zollner, & Dillmann, 2007). Different 
algorithms were utilized to predict obstacles on the vehicle trajectories for both 
intersection and non-intersection segments, including but not limited to: game theory 
(Martin, 2013), mixed-observability MDP (Meyer-Delius et al., 2009), and multiple 
criteria decision making (Furda & Vlacic, 2011). However, this risk analysis method is 
computationally expensive and the success in risk estimation depends on the correct 
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prediction of vehicles’ future trajectories. One example of a situation-based autonomous 










Ontology-based risk analysis method. Ontology is defined as the specification 
of a conceptualization of domain knowledge. It is the hierarchical semantic network of 
basic entities and their inter-relationships based on a corpus of texts. In ontology, a 
terminological box (TBox) carries the concepts of the domain. The TBox contains basic 
attributes, their relationships and rules as well as constraints on attributes. Instances of 
attributes and roles among such instances stay within an assertional box (ABox). Real 
world data and attribute properties can be stored in this box. A language used to represent 
the background knowledge in ontology is called description logic (DL), which is a subset 
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of the first order predicate logic. There are several tools available, such as PROTEGE and 
SWOOPS, which can edit and verify ontology consistencies.  
Researchers applied the ontology-based reasoning for risk analysis of an 
autonomous vehicle, as it is well suited for modeling multi-parameter traffic situations 
and also for performing logic reasoning. Complex traffic situations, like intersection 
traffic signal cycle times and phases, were modeled in the ontology (Keyarsalan & 
Montazer, 2010; Pommerening, Wölfl, & Westphal, 2009). This method was proposed 
and successfully utilized to represent different behaviors and depict the interactions 
between the attributes of road surroundings without stability issues (Armand, Filliat, & 
Ibañez-Guzman, 2014; Hülsen, Zöllner, & Weiss, 2011; Pollard, Morignot, & 
Nashashibi, 2013). The driver’s ability, road surroundings and vehicle performances were 
considered for modeling automated ground vehicles risk analysis (Pollard et al., 2013). 
Another ontology model was proposed to deduce the risks for autonomous navigation due 
to pedestrian behaviors (Armand et al., 2014). However, it was assumed that pedestrians 
and control vehicle will obey the traffic rules, which is not valid in the real world. Several 
sensors were maintained to acquire the information related to the road attributes, like a 
camera, radar, GPS, ultrasonic sensors, etc. It is preferred to enrich the data by using 
multiple sensors simultaneously, but the high price of multiple sensors, installation 
complexity and computation load could be a drawback. The footage captured from the 
driver’s perspective using a monocular camera were utilized in the proposed ontology-
based framework by Mohammad et al. (Worrall, Orchansky, Masson, & Nebot, 2010). 
The proposed ontology framework in this study is shown in Figure 7. The pedestrian 
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behaviors in different traffic scenarios were examined here; however, the authors did not 





Figure 7. An example of ontology structure for autonomous vehicle risk analysis 




Fault tree-based risk analysis method. The fault tree determines the potential 
causes of an undesired event, which represents a safety hazard or economic loss. It is 
suitable for a nonrepairable system where the failure of components is independent (Ma 
& Trivedi, 1999). This risk analysis method was proposed by the former AT&T Bell 
Laboratories (now Nokia Bell Labs), and was initially applied in the aerospace industry 
(F. I. Khan & Abbasi, 1998). The fault tree analysis method encourages analysis of how a 
particular component can impact the overall performance of a system and identify the 
causes of undesired events (Ansell & Wharton, 1992; Ballard, 1992; Wilson & H. C & 
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Keller, 1990). However, to understand the cause-effect process, a thorough review of the 
overall system is required to conduct an effective analysis (Vesely, 1984). Therefore, the 
fault tree starts from a complete system failure and moves backwards to identify all 
possible causes. A graphical technique is used to represent the fault tree structure where 
all components are branched off based on their interconnections with top level system 
failure. These branches are assumed to be independent of each other, i.e., mutually 
exclusive events (Bell & E, 1989). The analysis method has the ability to identify the 
shortest route (i.e., minimal cut-sets) to failure of the top-level event. However, some 
limitations of this risk analysis system must be recognized (Yllera, 1988), as the 
reliability and failure data of components of the fault tree are required in the analysis and 
these data control the accuracy of the analysis. To overcome this problem the researchers 
proposed fuzzy mathematics to reduce the dependency on component failure data (Rauzy, 
1993). 
Nowadays, this model is commonly used to evaluate the reliability of complex 
systems in many fields, both qualitatively and quantitatively, such as the systems found 
in nuclear reactors and petrochemical industries (M. A. Chowdhury, Garber, & Li, 
December 2000; Greenberg & Cramer, 1991; Lees, 1996; Qingyou & Hao, 1999). After 
the Challenger incident in 1986, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) emphasized performing quantitative risk or reliability analyses using the fault 
tree method for its space missions’ safety assessments. The US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission developed a handbook on fault tree construction and evaluation in 1981, and 
this manual has been considered as the leading technical document on fault tree 
application (Vesely, Goldberg, Roberts, & Haasl, 1981). Besides, this method has been 
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used in various other fields, such as aircraft design processes (Volkanovski, Cepin, & 
Mavko, 2009), vehicular navigation failures (Bhavsar, Das, Paugh, Dey, & Chowdhury, 
2017), nuclear power plant design (C. Alonso, 1998), industrial plant designs (Davis-
McDaniel, Chowdhury, Pang, & Dey, 2013; W. P. G. Schlechter, 1996), bridge failure 
analysis (Chapman, 1997), construction project management (Tiemessen & Zweeden, 
1998), toxic goods transport (Hurst, 1996), hazardous site management (Bogen, 1990), 
and medicine (Ammar, Cukic, Mili, & Fuhrman, 2000).  
Recently, researchers have utilized fault trees to analyze the impact of 
autonomous vehicle sensor failure on overall system success rates. In addition, the 
autonomous vehicle features solely responsible for turning a traditional vehicle into an 
autonomous vehicle has been evaluated using the fault tree analysis. Swarup and Rao 
disassembled the adaptive cruise control (ACC) system of an autonomous vehicle and 
investigated the causes of failures using the fault tree analysis method (Swarup & Rao, 
2014). RADAR and the speed sensor, two very important components of ACC system, 
were explored in this study and broke down into basic potential hazards. However, the 
authors only considered qualitative risk assessments of the ACC system and did not 
estimate the failure probability value of the overall system. Duran and Zalewski 
investigated the causes and effects of failures related to LIDAR and the camera-based 
computer vision system (Duran, Robinson, Kornecki, & Zalewski, 2013b). To estimate 
the failure probabilities, the Bayesian brief network was modeled, and the Netica tool 
was used for this purpose (Norsys). Figure 8 shows the fault tree’s graphical 








Researchers have identified different road variables, which could impact 
autonomous navigation, but the combined impact of all the different vehicular equipment, 
other road users, and infrastructure components was not investigated. The overall 
summary of different approaches conducted so far is sketched in Table 3. In this research, 
the fault tree analysis method was used to investigate the combined impact of vehicular 
components and transportation infrastructure component failures. The mathematical 
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Fault Tree Analysis Structure  
The fault tree is developed by disintegrating the overall system into its subsystem 
failures, which later breaks down into lower resolution events. This process continues 
until no further disintegration can take place. These terminating events are called “basic 
events.” The failure of the overall system is referred to as a “top-level event,” and the 
other events are linked to the top-level event with its basic events at the bottom, which 
are called “intermediate/ casual events.” The top-level event and basic events are 
interconnected based on the hierarchical and logical relationships between events that 
lead to the failure of the top event. The schematic of the fault tree in Figure 9 shows these 
logical relationships presented as “Gate.” The “AND” and “OR” gates are widely used to 









Besides the basic and intermediate events, undeveloped, conditional, and house 





events along with their symbols and description are shown in Figure 10, which also uses 









Fault tree mathematical formulation. In this study the logical relationships are 
restricted to “OR” and “AND” gates. An OR gate represents events that are mutually 
exclusive events, where one of the preceding events could lead to the failure of the 
overall system. In “Set Theoretic” terms, this is equivalent to the union of the basic and 
intermediate events. The probability of the OR gate output can be formulated as follow:  
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𝑃(𝑋 𝑂𝑅 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋 ∪  𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋) + 𝑃(𝑌) − 𝑃(𝑋 ∩  𝑌) 
On the other hand, an AND gate represents a combined failure of all events 
required to lead to a whole system failure. This gate is related to the intersection of two 
sets in the “Set Theory.” The mathematical formulation of AND gate is given below:   
𝑃(𝑋 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋 ∩  𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋) × 𝑃(𝑌) 
Summary 
In summary, researchers conducted the risk analysis of an autonomous vehicle 
using situation-based and ontology-based methodology. However, these risk analysis 
studies were focused on vehicular surrounding components. Not a single study was done 
on vehicular components until then. Recently, a fault-tree based risk analysis was 
completed considering the failure of autonomous vehicles due to vehicular components 
failure. However, this study failed to include the failures of infrastructure components in 
the autonomous vehicles risk analysis.  
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Chapter 3  
Method 
The research method featured in this paper focuses on utilizing the fault-tree 
analysis approach to identify risks associated with autonomous vehicle failure when it is 
sharing the roadway with other conventional vehicles driven by non-autonomous drivers. 
Later, an online survey was conducted to justify the failure probabilities of components 
through the literature review. Furthermore, a traffic micro-simulation platform was 
utilized to determine the safety and operational impact of autonomous vehicle 
deployment in a mixed traffic stream. This chapter presents the detailed approach 
adopted for this research. A summary of the overall research method is explained in the 
first section. Three separate but interconnected steps are followed in this research. These 
steps are explained in three consecutive sections. The first step, risk assessment, is 
described in Section 3.2. This step is further grouped into three sub-tasks. In the next 
section, the online survey structure is explained. Finally, Section 3.4 concentrates on 
traffic simulation development.   
Research Method   
The overall research method was divided into three major steps. The flow of the 
method is shown in Figure 11. The risks assessment of an autonomous vehicle was the 
first crucial step of this study. The second step focused on developing the structure of an 
online survey to seek information to revise the failure probabilities collected from the 
literature review and utilized in the first step. The survey instruments were prepared, and 
after the approval from Institutional Review Broad (IRB), the survey was released. The 
last step of this research was to develop the algorithms of autonomous vehicle navigation 
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in traffic simulation environment. The micro-level traffic simulation could allow 
development of an autonomous vehicle environment, where vehicles can be driven by 
themselves without any human intervention. The autonomous vehicle driving behavior 
was simulated to estimate the impact of sudden incidents in autonomous navigation due 
to the risks identified in the first step of this research. The simulation results represent 
real-world crash scenarios due to the failures of autonomous navigation and their impact 









Risk Analysis  
The risk assessment of an autonomous vehicle was divided into four sub-tasks; 
they are: i) risk identification, ii) risk estimation, and iii) risk hierarchization. After 
completing these sub-tasks, the risks were estimated using the fault tree analysis method. 
They were then validated by comparison with real-world data. 
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Risk identification. The first risk identification sub-task consists of a thorough 
literature review. This task was conducted by performing an extensive review of 
published reports and peer-reviewed conference and journal papers. This task also led to 
identifying the sources of potential risks and how much of an impact each potential 
failure has on the vehicle system as a whole. According to (D. White, 1995), four types of 
information about an autonomous vehicle system and its components are required for the 
risk analysis of autonomous vehicles. These four types of information are: 
(a) Nature and characteristics of the failure sources,  
(b) Chain of events,  
(c) Pathways and processes that connect the cause to the effect, and  
(d) Relationship between risk sources and effects.  
Risk estimation. The next sub-task is risk estimation which can be performed 
with various analysis methods. Although this study utilizes the fault tree analysis method, 
other methods were discussed briefly in Chapter 2. After identifying the hierarchical and 
logical relationships between the identified events in the previous sub-task, the fault trees 
were developed to determine failure events. The fault tree was started with a top level-
event, “autonomous vehicle failure,” and then divided into primary events that could lead 
to vehicle failure. Then, these primary events were further split into the events that could 
lead to the failure of the primary events. Here, gate selection between the “And” and 
“OR” gate plays an important role, because each gate represents a transition from a broad 
failure to a more localized failure. This process continues to the breakdown of lower level 
events until none of the events could be broken down any further, and the lowest level 
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events were classified as basic events. The steps for developing the fault tree are shown 









Risk hierarchization. Along with determining the overall system failure 
probabilities, the fault tree analysis method allows users to identify the shortest routes, 
called cut-sets, which can lead to failure of the system within the tree. Each cut-set or 
path can be obtained directly from the hierarchical relationships of the fault tree. In this 
study, the identified risks were ranked based on their failure probabilities.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, inputs of risk analysis could be plans, processes and 
reactions, substances, probability and frequency data, policy and management, 
environment, text, and historical knowledge. Just as quantitative risk analysis of 
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autonomous vehicles was set apart as a primary concern here, so probability rate and 
frequency are also considered important in this study. The ranking of failure risks could 
help develop cost effective risk minimization strategies, so hierarchization was selected 
as one of the four different types of outputs of general risk analysis. An analysis on 
equipment and restricted parts of autonomous vehicles was required here, so their failure 
probabilities were converted into numerical values. As a result, the probabilistic approach 









Evaluation of fault tree model. A fault tree analysis model can be validated 
qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative validation method considers the basic 
event identification and their relationship with top-level event(s). The quantitative 
method reviews and measures the failure probabilities (Tupper, Chowdhury, & Sharp, 
2014). Finally, the risks estimated in the previous simulated steps were validated by their 
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comparison with real-world data. For validation, the real-world data available from the 
California DMV autonomous vehicle testing records were utilized in this study. In 
Chapter 4, details about three autonomous vehicle risk analysis phases are adopted and 
their outcomes are discussed.  
Online Survey  
An online survey was conducted to revise and update the failure probabilities 
collected from the literature review. The main goal of this survey was to interview the 
subject matter experts (SMEs) or domain experts to seek further information, which can 
justify the literature review. The Delphi survey method was used to conduct this online 
survey.  
The Delphi survey method consists of a multi-round interactive anonymous 
interaction through the questionnaires among participants. The purpose of having 
multiple rounds is that the participants will review other experts’ responses and based on 
those, revise their previous answers in the following rounds. In this way the responses 
could be guided to achieve an expected level of consensus in multiple rounds.    
Developing survey instruments. The causal factors responsible for the overall 
autonomous vehicle failure were divided into two categories, as previously mentioned in 
Chapter 3. The first category identifies failure scenarios due to vehicular components, 
and the second one focuses on the transportation infrastructure components. To collect 




Research Question 1: Which vehicular component failure would lead to overall 
autonomous vehicle system failures, and what would be the probability of these 
component failures?  
Research Question 2: What type of transportation infrastructure component failures 
would cause autonomous vehicles failure? What would be the failure probabilities of 
infrastructure components? 
The questionnaire guided by the Delphi survey method is treated as a medium of 
anonymous communication among experts from different sectors, where the expressed 
responses are shared without participant identification. The first-round questionnaire is an 
open-ended solicitation of ideas. In the following round, the questions are crafted to 
guide the experts toward an expected level of consensus. To reduce bias, the sequence of 
questions was randomly generated in different versions. The inputs of experts in this 
research helped me gather the additional information on causal factors as well as the 
relationship between causal factors and the impact on overall system success rates. 
However, these experts were expected to have different perspectives, which meant 
viewing the autonomous vehicles from different dimensions. Thus, it was evident from 
the beginning that it would be impossible to obtain a reasonable degree of consensus 
without separating the experts into different panels. In this study, the experts were 
divided into three different panels based on the nature of their work area: 
i) Automotive company developers: (for example but not limited to: Google, 
Uber, Tesla and General Motors),  
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ii) University researchers (for example but not limited to: Stanford University, 
Carnegie Mellon University, University of Michigan, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, and University of Texas at Austin), and  
iii) Component company personnel (for example but not limited to: Velodyne 
LIDAR, Sanborn LIDAR, and US RADAR Inc.),  
Because the Delphi survey population requirements are modest, each panel 
contained 10 to 18 members, who are experts in the focus area of study (Hasson, Keeney, 
& McKenna, 2000). To enable global perspectives, 20% of the invited experts on each 
panel were chosen from outside the United States. 
The Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance, a statistical test, was utilized to 
measure the level of consensus. In this test, a high value of W (> 0.8) means that the 
participants applied essentially the same standard in judging the probabilities of the 
vehicular components or transportation infrastructure components. The steps involved in 





Figure 14. Steps involved in online survey 
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Simulation of Autonomous Vehicle   
The fault tree analysis results estimate the failure probability of autonomous 
vehicles sharing the roads with human drivers and other road-users. However, it is 
essential to further study how these failure probabilities will impact the overall efficiency 
of the roadway infrastructures. Keeping this object in mind, micro-level traffic simulation 
with an autonomous navigation environment was developed and analyzed using the fault 
tree results in simulation. The autonomous driving behavior was modeled in traffic 
simulation and the probabilities of autonomous vehicle failure were integrated into the 
model. In this research, vehicle platooning was evaluated as autonomous navigation; 
however autonomous vehicle lane changing behaviors were not included at this stage. 
After modeling the simulations, the results of traffic microsimulation were imported into 
a conflict analysis tool, which could estimate the reduction in crash frequencies. Finally, 
the impacts of autonomous navigation failures were studied using simulation analysis.   
The modeling of autonomous vehicles was split into four sub-tasks:  
i) traffic network modeling,  
ii) formulation of algorithms,  
iii) modeling multiple scenarios, and  
iv) conflict analysis.  
It is important to mention that the traffic microsimulation software package, PTV 
Vissim (version 7.00- 32 bits), was used in this study to model the road networks 
("VISSIM 7 User Manual," 2015). The benefit of using this simulation platform is that it 
enables users to develop and simulate specific user-defined driving behavior for either a 
specific percentage of total vehicles or all vehicles. Additionally, the Surrogate Safety 
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Assessment Model (SSAM), a conflict analysis tool, was utilized in this study (Pu & 
Joshi, 2008).  
Traffic network modeling. A segment of Interstate-476 in Pennsylvania was 
selected as the study region, and its traffic network was modeled in Vissim. The study 
area was bounded by US Route 3 near Haverford, PA on the north to I-95 near Woodlyn, 
PA on the south. The geometric parameters (for example but not limited to: number of 
lanes, lane widths, and turning radius) and designs were collected and modeled based on 
Google Maps using the satellite feature. Figure 15 shows the four junction points of the 
entire study’s road network. All related intersections and local road networks are in the 
simulation model as well as traffic counts collected from the 2015 Pennsylvania Highway 









The Vissim model includes 99 links and 186 connectors; totaling 49.87 kilometers 
of traffic network. Fourteen traffic signals were modeled on entrance ramps. 
Additionally, 232 conflict points were coded to represent the merging areas in the study 
traffic network. The model was then calibrated by adjusting speed distribution, human 
driving behaviors at merging regions and speed decision points by Hard Should Running 
Clinic Team.  
Number of simulation runs. It is important to introduce variability in traffic 
microsimulation, because even on a specific segment of highway, it is expected that 
traffic patterns will fluctuate based on multiple parameters, i.e., (for example but not 
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limited to time of the day, workdays, weather, seasons and traffic crashes). With current 
computation systems, it is not possible to generate a sequence of random numbers which 
cannot be reasonably predicted (Bahaaldin, Fries, Bhavsar, & Das, 2017; Vattulainen & 
Ala‐Nissila, 1995).  However, in Vissim, a parameter called “random seed” can actually 
initialize randomness in traffic patterns. Thus, a traffic microsimulation model with the 
same random seed value can produce similar results for operational parameters (i.e., 
measure of effectiveness), such as travel time, network speed, and density. If the random 
seed value is varied, then the built-in stochastic functions in Vissim will generate a 
stochastic variation of traffic arrivals in the microsimulation. Furthermore, the results 
generated from multiple runs of a single traffic microsimulation are required to draw a 
conclusion with statistical validity. However, it is essential to prove that the results are a 
true representation of the calibrated simulation model and not skewed towards a 
statistical outlier. The average results of multiple runs using different random seed values 
should stay within the true average range of the model, i.e., confidence level. It is 
important to mention that the average results of multiple runs do not necessarily have to 
be representative of real-world scenarios, unless the model has been pre-calibrated.     
In this research, the initial value of the random seed was assigned as 5; then, this 
value was incremented by 5 in each simulation run. It is recommended that the initial 
number of simulation runs should be 10 to determine the confidence level of simulated 
results (ODOT, 2011; WSDOT, 2014). Based on that, the base model was run initially 10 
times using different seed values stating from 5 and then increased by 5 after a single run. 
The average network speed and average travel time values for each travel time measured 
segment were recorded to calculate the true statistical average. Then a Student’s t-test 
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was conducted to validate the results collected from 10 initial runs. The t-statistic 
equation is expressed as:  




This equation can also be written as:   





where, ?̅? = sample average  
 𝜇 = population average 
 𝑆 = standard deviation of sample  
 𝑁 = sample size, i.e. number of simulation runs  
Furthermore, this equation was rearranged to calculate the number of simulation 
runs required to achieve the average values of parameters within a predetermined 
confidence level. Considering a confidence level of 95%, the following equation was 
developed (WSDOT, 2014):   






where, 𝑅 = 95% confidence interval for a true average  
 𝑆 = standard deviation for selected parameters, i.e., measure of effectiveness  
 𝑡0.025,𝐷𝐹= 𝑁−1 = Student’s t-statistics for two-sided error of 2.5% with 𝑁 − 1 
degrees of freedom  
However, in this research, the network average speed values for different time 
intervals collected from initial 10 simulation runs were used to determine the number of 
simulation runs required to draw a convincing conclusion. The error tolerance was set at 
10%. The number of simulation runs required was calculated using a network speed 
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average for a time interval between 600 and 1500 seconds as per Equation (3). The 
network average speed values and detailed calculations are presented in Appendix A.  











 = 1.42 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠  
This calculation shows that 10 simulation runs were enough to achieve the 
average of parameters within a 95% confidence level, which supported a statistically 
validated conclusion. However, in this research total 11 simulation runs were executed to 
easily address the simulation run that provide median values of the assigned parameters.    
Furthermore, the average travel time value recorded for each time interval for 
each measured travel time segment was used to calculate the number of simulation runs 
required, since travel time was considered the measure of effectiveness for performance 
evaluation. It was found that 10 simulation runs were enough for reporting results within 
a 95% confidence level. However, as mentioned earlier, the calibrated simulation model 
was run 11 times in this research. The detailed calculations are provided in Appendix A. 
Formulation of the autonomous navigation algorithm. Traffic analysis in 
computer simulation has become familiar nowadays with the advancement in computing 
power (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2011; Rossetti & Ni, 2010). Researchers found 
that a traffic simulation model could represent real-world scenarios after proper 
calibration and validation, and the results of simulation were satisfactory (Gomes, May, 
& Horowitz, 2004; Mahmassani, Hou, & Dong, 2012). The Vissim (version 7.00), one of 
the micro-level traffic simulation software platforms, was utilized to model traffic 
network in this research. Vissim was chosen because of its component object model 
(COM) interface and its external driver model (EDM) availability to simulate 
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autonomous driving behavior. However, this software platform has its own in-built 
driving model based on the Wiedemann algorithm developed in 1974. This driving model 
was built to predict non-autonomous driving behavior at the micro-level. Therefore, to 
simulate autonomous navigation, user defined driving algorithms were required. 
However, Vissim allows building a platform which can integrate the EDM algorithms, 
coded by the user. In this research autonomous driving algorithms were developed and 
integrated with the Vissim platform. These external driving algorithms were used to 
replace the in-built human driving behaviors and simulate the autonomous driving 
environment. This autonomous driving environment was used to assess the impact of risk 
analysis results at the micro-level. Furthermore, this autonomous vehicle simulation was 
applied to predict future traffic scenarios when autonomous vehicles would be 
implemented in roadways. It is important to mention again that autonomous platooning 
was considered in this research, where driving maneuvers like lane change were not 
considered.  
External driver model algorithm. The external driver model will allow replacing 
the internal driving behavior and implementing user-defined behaviors. Based on user-
defined algorithms, a dynamic link library (DLL) written in C/C++ is integrated with the 
simulation model and was activated during the simulation run (code is presented in 
Appendix B). In every single simulation time step, Vissim calls the DLL code to 
determine the status of the specific vehicle in the next simulation time step ("VISSIM 7 
User Manual," 2015).  
The steps followed to develop and run the external driver model are described 
here. At first, a new vehicle type was created in Vissim, and this vehicle type followed 
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the autonomous driving algorithms to move one position to another position. To integrate 
the autonomous driving algorithms, a dynamic link library (DLL) was created in C++ 
language. The DLL files are comparable with the EXE files; however, they are not 
directly executable like EXEs. The DLL files require a platform/ program to execute, and 
this creates interdependency. Similarly, the DLL file developed in this study was 
executed in the Vissim environment, where Vissim communicates with the DLL file to 
predict the next move of a specific vehicle type, i.e., in this case, autonomous vehicles. 
This DLL file for autonomous navigation has three parts; they are:  
i) Main function 
ii) Header File  
iii) Resource File  
The main function encompassed the algorithms of driving behaviors, and the 
header file was used to translate the outcomes of algorithms into Vissim variables. 
Finally, a resource file was developed to create the sequence of functions needed to 
execute while running the traffic simulation. The main file contains three functions 
required to move autonomous vehicles, they are:  
(i) Set value: Vissim passes current information of the vehicle,  
(ii) Get value: retrieve new information based on defined algorithms, and  
(iii) Execute command: Passes the request of execution to Vissim.   
The overall flow of information is presented in Figure 16. Based on the current 
vehicle information, algorithms identify the leading vehicle type and estimate the speed 
of the leading vehicle at the time. Then a polar question arises as to whether the leading 
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vehicle is a similar autonomous vehicle type. If the answer to this question is yes, then 









The distance between the current and leading vehicle is used as parameter for 
creating a platoon. The threshold values for vehicle platooning are 6.6 feet as the desired 
gap or distance and 3.3 feet as the emergency gap distance. If a vehicle is more than 6.6 
feet from the leading vehicle, then the current vehicle will accelerate to get closer to the 
leading vehicle. Hence, if the current vehicle comes within less than 3.3 feet from the 
lead vehicle, the current vehicle will decelerate to increase the gap between them. The 
architecture of autonomous driving is given in Figure 17. Additionally, the mathematical 




Speed Difference,  
 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) =  𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑜(𝑡) − 𝑣𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑡) = 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 − 
 = 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (6) 
Case 1: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) > 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) >  𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠, then 




   (7) 
where, 𝑎(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒  
𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑝   
Case 2: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) > 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 < 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) <  𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠,  then  
 𝑎(𝑡) =  
− 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑡−(𝑡−1)
  (8) 
where, 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 = 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  
Case 3: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) > 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 > 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) 




   (9) 
Case 4: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) < 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) >  𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠,  then   




  (10) 
Case 5: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) < 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 < 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) <  𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠,  then  
 𝑎(𝑡) =  
 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) 
𝑡−(𝑡−1)
  (11) 
Case 6: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡) < 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 > 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡), then 













Modeling multiple scenarios. The base model was coded with autonomous 
vehicles’ market penetration level with 0 percentages representing current mixed traffic 
scenarios. This percentage of market penetration level then gradually increased to 
simulate future scenarios. For example: 10%, 25%, 50% and 90%. It is important to 
mention that autonomous passenger cars are considered in this risk analysis research, and 
other different transportation modes not considered for example but not limited to transit, 
heavy-goods vehicles, and motorcycles. The Visssim vehicle types represent vehicles 
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other than passenger cars, i.e., transit vehicles, trucks, motorcycles, etc., that were not 
modified at all. They were used in Vissim vehicle navigation algorithms built into the 
software platform. Furthermore, the demand for these vehicles did not change over time; 
and hence their penetration level was constant over the time period.  
However, demand analysis of autonomous vehicles was not included in this 
research, since it is not within the scope of the research. It was assumed a gradual 
increase of these vehicles will continue over a period of time, i.e., years. Furthermore, 
researchers have predicted that the autonomous vehicles could increase the travel 
distance, i.e., vehicle mileage, and hence, congestion will  also increase as vehicle travel 
becomes more convenient (Smith, 2012). In (Stefan Trommer et al., 2016), Trommer et 
al. estimated that vehicle travel distance by 2035 will see an additional increase of at least 
3 to 9% after autonomous vehicles are implemented on the road. Additionally, disabled 
persons, elders, and children, who were restricted from driving altogether, will have their 
independent mobility. However, these new road user groups, i.e., disabled persons and 
elders, may increase the number of vehicles waiting behind the “red” traffic signal light 
by up to 11% (Michael Sivak & Schoettle, 2015). It is important to include these 
perspectives in simulation modeling, since network travel times could deviate due to their 
impact. However, these futuristic problems are not within the scope this research and 
their impacts have not been validated yet using real world data.  
Conflict analysis. The objectives of conflict analysis are to identify the 
improvements in traffic crash reduction after implementing autonomous vehicles on our 
roadways to quantify the impacts of autonomous vehicle crashes on the overall 
performance of transportation infrastructure. This analysis could be a platform where 
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results of the fault tree models could be integrated with traffic simulation modeling. 
Based on the objectives, the conflict analysis could be divided into two phases.  
Crash frequency estimation. Using simulation modeling, the assessment of traffic 
safety, i.e., crash analysis, is always difficult because of pre-built evasive algorithms in 
traffic simulation software. However, researchers have developed effective analyses of 
the relationships between traffic crashes and traffic conflicts (F. Amundsen & Hyden, 
1977), where the intersection of two or more vehicles is defined as a conflict. Until 
recently traffic conflicts were surveyed by trained personnel by observing a traffic fleet. 
But this method could be questionable due to the surveyor’s subjective judgements 
(Huang, Liu, Yu, & Wang, 2013). After a thorough research, the “Surrogate Safety 
Assessment Model (SSAM)” was developed by a research team at Siemens ITS, 
sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), to integrate traffic 
simulation modeling and conflict analysis together. In this tool, a crash is considered 
between two vehicles, which are on a collision course, but due to evasive actions the 
crash is prevented. This model uses the trajectory files imported from microscopic traffic 
simulation models and calculates the number of conflicts utilizing several algorithms. 
The number of conflicts, types of conflicts, severity and location of conflicts are the 
outputs of SSAM models. There are five parameters used in this model to estimate the 
severity of simulated conflicts: time-to-collision (TTC), post encroachment time (PET), 
deceleration rate (DR), maximum speed (MaxS) and speed difference (DeltaS). Three 
different types of crashes can be modeled using the SSAM tool. These crash types are 
separated based on the conflict angles between the vehicles. Figure 18, from the SSAM 
manual, shows the angle variation of these crash types (Pu & Joshi, 2008). Three types of 
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crash are considered in SSAM: 1) rear end collisions, 2) lane-changing conflicts, and 3) 
crossing collisions. However, traffic crashes are certain, where conflicts are more 
frequent then crashes. It is really important that the SSAM models are calibrated and 
validated using real-world data to estimate realistic crash frequency values (Vasconcelos, 









In this research, the SSAM tool was used to estimate and compare crash 
frequencies between two traffic models, i.e., specifically simulation models with different 
autonomous vehicle market penetration levels. To conduct conflict analysis, trajectories 
files were generated in the Vissim model after first running simulations. These 
trajectories files with the “.TRJ” extension were originally a binary file that contained the 
course of vehicle positions, i.e. trajectory, through the modeled traffic network. These 
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trajectory files were imported to the SSAM model to estimate the frequency of traffic 
conflicts. However, since the traffic simulation model was calibrated and validated using 
real-world data the requirements of SSAM model calibration were overridden. Figure 19 










In SSAM software, the default values of TTC and PET are 1.50 and 4.00 seconds, 
respectively. These values were estimated based on previous research on urban signalized 
intersections, i.e., low-speed road networks (25 to 30 mph). However, it is expected that 
the perception reaction time (PRT) and maneuver time (MT) will be lower for 
autonomous vehicles than for non-autonomous drivers. As a result, along with the default 
TCC value, two other values, 0.9 and 1.2, were used in this research to investigate the 
variation in the conflict frequencies based on TTC values. A PET value of 3.00 was 
additionally examined besides the default PET value.  
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Integration of fault tree and simulation modeling. Risk analysis of an 
autonomous vehicle was conducted to estimate the failure probability of autonomous 
navigation due to either vehicular components or transportation infrastructure component 
failures. This failure probability represents the number of incident failures that could 
occur per certain distance traveled over the period of a vehicle’s life. In other words, the 
possibility of a traffic crash will be high after certain distances of travel, i.e., in this 
research per 1,000,000 miles. Later on, the results of risk analysis models were integrated 
in the Vissim model to estimate the impacts of these failures on the performance of 
transportation infrastructures. However, the years a vehicle is driven before it dies 
depends on various parameters, i.e., vehicle maintenance, annual mileage, and weather. 
On an average, it is expected that the life of a new vehicle should be around 8 years. 
Modeling the entire life cycle of a vehicle is not feasible in traffic simulation, not even 
for one vehicle driving 1,000,000 miles as determined in the network modeled earlier. 
Instead, it was assumed that all vehicles released in simulation would travel 1,000,000 
miles collectively; then, a traffic crash scenario would arise. The overall algorithm is 
represented in Figure 20. A visual basic code was utilized to generate the failure of 












In summary, the three major steps, i.e. overall research method, in this research process 
are described in this chapter. The steps for fault tree-based risk analysis are mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, followed by the survey structure. The chapter also explains 
the details of traffic microsimulation development. The analysis and results of the fault 




Risk Analysis of Autonomous Vehicle  
The comprehensive risk analysis of autonomous vehicles in a mixed traffic stream 
is presented in this chapter, which can be divided into four interconnected sub-sections. 
Because investigating vehicular components and analyzing their behaviors are the first 
crucial step of risk analysis, this chapter starts with a detailed description of the 
autonomous vehicle risk identification process. The next sub-section summarizes the risk 
estimation, followed by risk hierarchization. The validation of risk estimation is 
presented in last sub-section of this chapter.   
Risk Identification  
Autonomous vehicles are equipped with various sensors and actuators, and 
communication platforms, which are interconnected to sense the roadway and other road 
users. They comply with traffic rules and regulation and navigate in the traffic stream 
without human intervention. Each of these components has its own failure mechanisms 
and reliability functions. Investigating these failure mechanisms is required to ensure safe 
navigation. To identify and analyze the basic components, risk identification was started 
by disintegrating the autonomous vehicle system into each of its individual components, 
and then analyzing their behavior. A detailed literature review of published reports, peer-
reviewed conference and journal papers, and other published materials was conducted to 
estimate the failure probability of each component and develop hierarchical and logical 
relationships between the top-level event (failure of an autonomous vehicle) and different 
autonomous vehicle components.  
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We have been seeing that the transition from conventional system to advanced 
technologies normally takes place over a period of time such as the quality and extent of 
computer upgrades (new models) from the 1960s until now. Therefore, it is expected that 
the transition from a conventional non-autonomous vehicle fleet to an autonomous 
vehicle fleet will likely go through a series of gradual changes over the years. This 
suggests that autonomous vehicles will share the roadway with conventional vehicles 
such as cars, transit buses, trucks, as well as bicycle riders, motorcyclists, and pedestrians 
for many years to come. As a result, a risk analysis of autonomous vehicles needs not 
only to include the failure mechanisms of vehicular components, but also consider the 
impacts of transportation infrastructure component failures.  
The risk identification process was divided into two subcategories to estimate 
failure risks of autonomous vehicles due to different vehicular components and 
transportation infrastructure components. The first category focused on identifying 
threats from autonomous vehicular components, and the second category focused on 
identifying threats from infrastructure components, including threats from other non-
autonomous vehicles.  
Autonomous vehicle components. In Chapter 2, the literature review presented 
automotive features which could convert a conventional vehicle into an autonomous 
vehicle. These automotive features then led to the development of the necessary sensors 
and components of an autonomous vehicle. All these sensors and components were 
categorized into four major subsystems: hardware, software, communication, and human-
machine interface. The hardware system includes sensors and components, such as 
LIDAR, radar, camera, GPS, wheel encoders, and the integration platform. The sensors in 
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hardware system are utilized to collect the surrounding information, whereas the software 
subsystem consists of the data processing software required for autonomous navigation. 
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure (V2X) communication platforms 
are included in the communication subsystem, along with communication database 
failure. The final major subsystem is the human machine interface, which is used as a 
personal assistant system that filters the human voice for commands to control various 
autonomous driving functions. It is important to note that in this study; only additional 
new technologies that convert a conventional human operated vehicle into an 
autonomous vehicle were considered.  
LIDAR, the primary technology being used for autonomous navigation, can fail 
owing to several reasons, including laser malfunction, mirror motor malfunction, optical 
receiver damages and electrical failures (Duran et al., 2013b). Similarly, camera vision is 
another very important component on an autonomous vehicle, capable of providing 
physical information about surroundings (for example but not limited to: obstacles, road 
signs, and pedestrians). This system can also fail; however, misalignment, a missing 
filter, dirty or damaged lens, and even improper lighting are only a few problems than 
can lead to the failure of a camera. Detection failure of radar was estimated and 
mathematically modeled so that the detection could fail two times out of 100 runs. After 
real-world testing, it was estimated that the GPS system could fail due to variations in the 
signal environment. Additionally, a wheel encoder could fail due to the loss of motor 
stator synchronization and rotor positions. Furthermore, the integration platform is used 
for communicating between all the sensors and units; thus, the hardware sensors 
communicate with the data processing unit and the software unit, and any platform failure 
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could be critical to the continuance of a vehicle’s autonomous navigation. The failure 
probability of the integration platform was 2% when a two-state model was developed.  
Since the driving responsibilities are essentially shifting away from active human 
control to complete automation, the reliability of an autonomous vehicle software system 
needs to be validated before deploying these vehicles on the roads. In an experiment, it 
was found that software failed to generate a signal 1% of the time based on the array 
definition language (ADL) statements. However, the database server could lose its 
functionality due to operability and connectivity failures. In addition, the human machine 
interaction platform could play an important role in the performance of the autonomous 
vehicle. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) analyzed a dataset 
of over 115 months and calculated the probability of human error (i.e., wrong commands) 
over certain periods of time. Another study was conducted to estimate the rate of system 
failures in detecting human commands and found that the detection could fail 1.4 times 
out of 100 human commands.  
Additionally, during location updates, long-term evolution (LTE) networks could 
fail 5.88% times due to its control-plane failures. Other researchers evaluated the Wi-Fi 
reliability with 10 vehicles, where messages were transmitted to and from moving 
vehicles using open Wi-Fi. However, due to the high rate of package losses these 
transmissions failed 5.125% times over the experiments. Besides these, database service 
has a failure probability of 3.86% due to connectivity losses and operability failures. The 
failure probabilities for all these components along with reasons for failure are 
summarized in Table 4 based on findings from literature reviews. Furthermore, the failure 
of the vehicle’s mechanical system was not in the scope of this study as it is not a part of  
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Transportation infrastructure components. Autonomous vehicles are expected 
to be gradually introduced to general traffic with initially low market penetration rates. 
Thus, the surrounding infrastructure of an autonomous vehicle including other non-
autonomous vehicles (i.e., human drivers) can have a tremendous impact on autonomous 
navigation. Failure will create a reliability issue for the autonomous vehicle. Recent 
reports of autonomous vehicles testing submitted by companies that conduct autonomous 
vehicle testing, indicate that the majority of autonomous vehicle-involved crashes are due 
to human drivers sharing the road with autonomous vehicles (Delphi, 2016; Google, 
2016; Mercedes-Benz, 2016; Nissan, 2016; Volkswagen, 2016).  
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Autonomous vehicles have been tested in mixed traffic streams during low market 
penetration to determine their level of performance, and non-autonomous vehicle   
drivers are a major issue in mixed traffic streams. Thus, crash records related to reckless 
driving, distraction, vehicle breakdown and fatigue were collected from traffic crash 
reports involving non-autonomous vehicles of the Virginia Department of Transportation 
(VDOT) and New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) (NYSDOT, 
2015; VDOT, 2015). The data were then converted into crash rate per mile of 
autonomous vehicles (i.e., basic events’ failure probability) in the fault tree. In this 
research, the market penetration rate of 10% of the autonomous vehicles was used to 
calculate the failure probability of an autonomous vehicle traveling in a mixed traffic 
stream. To consider the worst-case scenario, 10% of total crashes on a roadway are 
considered to affect autonomous vehicle’s navigation in a mixed traffic stream. A sample 
calculation is presented in Appendix D to describe the details of failure probability 
calculation for an autonomous vehicle (AV), when it is involved in a crash due to 
reckless driving, fatigue or distraction of a non-autonomous vehicle (non-AV) driver.  
Incident rates due to poor weather and road conditions were collected from 
VDOT and NYSDOT as traffic crashes attributed to bad/poor road conditions were 
considered as transportation infrastructure failures. Bicyclists and pedestrians involved in 
crashes were also included. A study in Hawaii found that 83.5% crashes between motor 
vehicles and cyclists were caused by motorists and the other 16.5% were caused by 
cyclists (Schroeder & Wilbur, 2013). Weather is a huge deterrent to autonomous 
vehicles, especially since few autonomous vehicles have been tested in adverse weather. 
Construction work zones crashes were also considered; particularly rear-end crashes 
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(Ullman, Finley, Bryden, Srinivasan, & Council, 2008). Table 5 reports failure 
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After estimation of the failure probabilities of vehicular components and 
transportation infrastructure components, the next step of autonomous vehicle risk 
analysis is calculating the top-level failure rates. According to Stanford University’s 
Department of Global Ecology, “Risk assessment often begins by looking at one part of 
the problem, usually the source of the effect, rather than considering the system as a 
whole” (A. V. White & Burton, 1980). Fault-tree analysis approaches assessment from a 
top-down approach, as risk estimation begins with the root cause of the basic/ primary 
components failures and proceeds to estimate the failure probability of the top-level 
event. Furthermore, this method can provide the shortest path to reach that top-level 
failure from a single component failure. Because of these benefits, the fault tree analysis 
model was utilized to perform risk estimation in this study. The previous task was risk 
identification guided to analyze the behavior of vehicular components and transportation 
components in mixed traffic streams, and to estimate the failure probabilities of these 
components. Based on these failure probabilities, fault-tree models were developed and 
will be explained in following subsections. The risks associated with autonomous 
vehicles were categorized into two sub-sections, vehicular components and transportation 
infrastructure components; thus, two separate fault tree models were developed based on 
the risks introduced in the two following sub-sections. The two fault trees models are: 
(i) Fault tree model for autonomous vehicle failure due to vehicular component 
failures, and  
(ii) Fault tree model for autonomous vehicle failure due to transportation 
infrastructure component failures.  
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However, these models were eventually combined to estimate the overall risk of failure, 
i.e., failure of an autonomous vehicle in mixed traffic streams. 
Fault tree for autonomous vehicular component failures. The fault tree is 
developed by disintegrating an overall system into lower resolution events. This process 
continues until no further disintegration can take place. These terminating events are 
called “basic events”. The failure of the overall system is referred to as a “top-level 
event” and the events linking a top-level event with its basic events are called 
“intermediate/ casual events.” The top-level event and its basic events are interconnected 
based on hierarchical and logical relationships between the events that led to failure of 
the top event. In a graphical representation of a fault tree, these logical relationships are 
presented as “gates.” The “AND” and “OR” gates are widely used to illustrate the 
relationship between input and output events. Risk estimation quantifies the failure rate 
of the top-level event and is represented as a percentage in decimal format. This 
estimation takes all basic events into account and determines the failure rate based on 
Boolean algebra. The algebraic equations that are performed are determined by the gates 
used and the statistical model that was used when inputting basic events. 
The first fault-tree model was developed considering the failure of an autonomous 
vehicle due to vehicular components. The Isograph FaultTree+ software, which allows 
various statistical models to model basic event failure probability distribution, was used 
for fault the tree analysis ("Commercial Software for Fault Tree Analysis,"). For this 
study, a “fixed probability” statistical model was used to perform the risk analysis 
("Commercial Software for Fault Tree Analysis,"). After allocating basic event failure 
probabilities and solving the fault tree, a failure rate of 14.22% was determined for the 
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autonomous vehicle due to its components’ failure, which means that autonomous vehicle 
operations could fail 14.22 times over its lifetime due to component failure. Figure 21 
illustrates the fault tree with failure probabilities including only autonomous vehicle 
components.  
Fault tree for transportation infrastructure component failures. Following 
the same steps applied in first fault tree, the second fault tree was constructed using the 
other road users and infrastructure failure probabilities. The top-level event for the 
second fault-tree model was “failure of autonomous vehicle due to infrastructure 
components.” This model includes failure of the autonomous vehicle due to other road 
users, weather, construction zones or road conditions. The infrastructure-focused fault 
tree is illustrated in Figure 22. After allocating the failure probabilities of transportation 
infrastructure components it was found that the failure probability of autonomous vehicle 













Combined fault tree. The sources of all the vehicular component failures and 
also transportation infrastructure component failures were different. It is important to 
mention that few probabilities were estimated after field experiments and where others 
calculated probabilities based on mathematical modeling and simulation. However, 
combining these two fault trees, i.e., considering vehicular component failures and 
transportation infrastructure failures is the next step of this research. This follows the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) practice of estimating failure 
probabilities of basic events by applying different methods, including experimental 
estimation and simulation modeling (H. Dezfuli et al., 2011). Opinions of subject matter 
experts are also considered in probability estimations (Safie, Stutts, & Huang, 2015). The 
risk analysis of NASA’s missions often involves the integration of various risk models, 
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which include failure probabilities computed by applying various methods (H. Dezfuli et 
al., 2011; Safie et al., 2015). Similarly, to estimate the failure probability of an 
autonomous vehicle travelling in a mixed traffic stream, the two fault trees developed 
were combined to calculate combined results of failure due to failure probabilities of 
autonomous vehicular components and transportation infrastructure components 
estimated through their respective fault-tree models (illustrated in Figure 23) as described 
below.  
The failure probabilities of individual vehicular components collected from 
literature were presented early in this chapter. However, when these components become 
parts/subsystems of an autonomous vehicle, the car manufacturer will ensure that they 
remain operational throughout the life of the vehicle with periodic health monitoring and 
maintenance. Typically a conventional vehicle can be driven for 150,000 miles in its 
lifetime (Lu, 2006). Based on this information, it was assumed that the life of an 
autonomous vehicle is also 150,000 miles, and this assumption was used to estimate an 
autonomous vehicle failure probability per mile. Given that the overall probability of an 
autonomous vehicle failure in its lifetime is due to vehicular components the failure 
probability was 14.22%. The failure probability per mile can be estimated as 0.0000948% 
(i.e., 14.22%/150,000). However, the failure probability of this vehicle due to 
transportation infrastructure components is calculated at 0.01571% per mile, as 
mentioned previously. Furthermore, these two fault tree models were combined into one 
fault tree to estimate the overall failure probability of an autonomous vehicle due to 
vehicular component failures and transportation infrastructure failures in mixed traffic 
streams. It was assumed that the failure due to vehicular components and failure due to 
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infrastructure components were independent of each other and can be combined with an 
‘OR’ gate to estimate the failure probability of overall autonomous vehicle system.  The 
following equation was used to calculate the failure probability for the top-level event 
(i.e., failure of an autonomous vehicle) of the combined fault tree. The ‘+’ sign in the 
equation represents the ‘OR’ gate. As shown in the following equation, an autonomous 
vehicle operation could fail 158 times in 1,000,000 miles of travel due to failure of either 
vehicular components or infrastructure components in a mixed traffic stream. The 
combined fault tree is shown in Figure 23.  
P(A) = P(VC) + P(IC) = 0.000000948+0.0001571 = 0.000158048 per mile of travel (13)  
where, P(A) = Overall failure probability of autonomous vehicle system per mile of travel  
P(VC) = Autonomous vehicle failure due to vehicular components per mile of travel. 













Along with determining failure rates, a fault tree allows for cut sets to be 
identified within the tree which is the direct path from a basic event to the top-level 
event. Once all cut sets are calculated the fault tree becomes valuable. The cut set also 
allows engineers to determine which components to address in order to improve the 
performance of an autonomous vehicle. The cut sets that are particularly important are 
the “minimum cut set,” which exposes the basic level component because its failure will 
lead to a top-level failure in the shortest amount of time. This mathematical method was 
used to identify all combinations which are essentially the hierarchical sequence of events 
that can result in the failure of the main event. The logical relationships between top level 
and basic event are transformed using Boolean algebra, where all basic event failures are 
considered binary in nature, i.e., either working or failed. Notably, all component failures 
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were assumed to be independent, and failure rates were constant over time. Cut-sets also 
help decision makers to prioritize which components need to be addressed first to 
improve the safety performance of an autonomous vehicle. Once all cut-sets are 
identified, they can be ranked with associated failure probabilities.  
Ten cut-sets were distinguished in the analyzed fault trees considering the failure 
probabilities of vehicular components and infrastructure components with the use of 
Isograph FaultTree+ software. These cut-sets were ranked in order of their failure 
probabilities. For example: hardware system failure could occur due to integration 
platform failure or sensor failure, while sensor failure will fail if the primary sensor and 
back sensor fail. Algebraic representation is given below:  
 𝑄 = 𝑃(𝐼𝑃) ∪ 𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑃(𝐼𝑃) ∪ [𝑃(𝑃𝑆) ∩ 𝑃(𝐵𝑆)] (14)  
where, 𝑄 = Hardware system cut set failure probability  
𝑃(𝐼𝑃) = Integration platform failure probability  
𝑃(𝑆) = Sensor failure probability  
𝑃(𝑃𝑆) = Primary sensor failure probability  
𝑃(𝐵𝑆) = Backup sensor failure probability 
Table 6 presents ranked cut-sets with their failure probabilities. It was found that 
the failure of the communication system could be the most vulnerable event of all the 
basic events with a failure probability is 9.513%. Hardware system failure, which is 
caused by sensitive sensor and actuator failures, was found in the second position with a 
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Evaluation of Fault Tree Model  
It is required that a fault tree analysis model developed based on failure 
probabilities collected from different sources should be validated both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The qualitative validation method considers the basic events identification 
and their relationship with the top-level event(s) (M. Chowdhury, Garber, & Li, 2000; 
Kuzminski et al., 1995). A quantitative method includes comparing the failure 
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probabilities estimated through a fault-tree analysis to real-world data (Tupper et al., 
2014). In this research, the results from the fault tree models were compared with the 
real-world data available from the California DMV autonomous vehicles testing records 
(Delphi, 2016; Google, 2016; Mercedes-Benz, 2016; Nissan, 2016; Volkswagen, 2016). 
According to California DMV autonomous vehicle testing regulations, all autonomous 
vehicle manufactures and developers holding a permit to test must submit accident 
reports within 10 days of the incidents and an additional disengagement report annually 
(Pinto, 2012). The summary of collected crash and disengagement data from California 
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The failure probabilities of cut-sets were compared with the percentages of each 
crash type reported in the California DMV reports to validate the fault tree analysis 
findings. Thus, these crashes represent the same basic event failures that lead to cut-sets. 
Figure 24 compares the ranks given to each basic system failure event by the final 
combined fault-tree model versus the real-world data. In Figure 24, all basic failure 
events are ranked in a descending order of failure probability (i.e., the failure probability 
decreases with the increase in rank). For example, rank of 2 for hardware system failure 
suggests that there is a high probability of failure due to hardware failure compared to 









It is found that the failure probability of communication system (ranked 1 based 
on the fault tree risk analysis) matches the real-world autonomous vehicle test data (also 
ranked 1 based on real world test data). A significant difference in the ranking of failure 
due to ‘vehicle-passenger interaction’ between the fault-tree analysis (ranked 6) and the 
real-world (ranked 2) indicates that the software system and algorithms are going through 
technological advancements which are captured in the fault-tree analysis but not reflected 
in the earlier real-world test results. Furthermore, the lower ranking (i.e., higher failure 
probability) using real-world data includes disengagement events reported by various car 
manufacturers in which the primary cause of disengagement from autonomous driving is 
discomfort felt by the driver (Nissan, 2016). The driver may experience discomfort and 
disengage from self-driving to manual driving. The possible reasoning for that could be:  
(i) The driver perceives actions taken by the autonomous mode are not safe; or  
(ii) The autonomous vehicle has failed to recognize the driver’s command.  
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However, with the improvement in algorithms and the increased adaptation, this 
discomfort may reduce, thus reducing the failure probability (Calvo-Porral, Faíña-Medín, 
& Nieto-Mengotti, 2017). The lower real-world rankings (i.e., higher failure probability) 
of weather events and non-autonomous vehicle events, in the fault-tree analysis, 
compared to the real-world reports suggest that autonomous vehicles have not been tested 
in various weather conditions and at different penetration levels.  
Summary 
In summary, autonomous vehicles could be stopped 14.22 times over its lifetime 
due to the failures of vehicular components. On the other hand, the failures of 
infrastructure components also could lead to autonomous vehicle failure, and this failure 
rate was calculated as 0.01571% per mile of travel. Later, the failures of autonomous 
vehicles due to vehicular components and infrastructure components were combined and 
the overall failure rate was 0.01571% per mile of travel. The fault tree results were then 
validated using real-world autonomous vehicles testing data. Concluding remarks on the 
risk analysis of autonomous vehicles results are presented in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, the 




Chapter 5  
Online Survey 
This chapter is divided into three sections: developing survey instruments, 
presenting the detailed steps needed to prepare the survey instruments, i.e. participants’ 
list and questionnaire, and survey results. The survey results are summarized and 
tabulated. Finally, the survey results are analyzed using Kendall’s W coefficient of 
concordance.  
Developing Survey Instruments   
The Delphi survey method was first introduced for handling the opinions of a 
group of experts on national security issues; however the application of this survey 
method has experienced different stages of development and modification (Rieger, 1986). 
This method can be utilized as a judgement, decision-making aid or a forecasting tool, 
where the subjective judgements of individuals could benefit from this method of 
problem solving (Gregory J. Skulmoski, 2007). The Delphi method can also guide when 
there is incomplete knowledge about a problem (Mbakwe, Saka, Choi, & Lee, 2016). 
Furthermore, the method developed for this research focuses on consensus building 
among the participants. Although there are variations in the survey focuses and 
techniques, four basic characteristics of this survey method usually remain same (Rowe 
& Wright, 2001); they are: i) anonymity, ii) iteration, iii) controlled feedback, and iv) 
statistical group responses.  
A flow chart of this survey is shown in Figure 25. The experts were grouped into 
three panels based on their areas of expertise, since these groups have different 
perspectives. The three panels were 1) academic researchers’ panel, 2) autonomous 
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vehicle industry researchers, and 3) an experts’ panel from component companies, 












A total of 140 people were invited for participation in the first round of survey 
distribution. However, among the invited participants only seven experts responded in 
this round: 50% of the responders were university researchers, 20% were researchers in 
industry including the manager of a development team. In the second round, about 40% 
of the survey participants had “more than 9 years” experience working in the autonomous 
vehicle research field, and another 25% had “5–9 years” of working experience.  
Survey participants were asked to identify the primary sensor failure which could 
lead to overall autonomous vehicle failure. About 85% of the participants agreed that 
LIDAR and camera vision could impact the success rate of autonomous vehicle 
navigation, while 55% believed the GPS systems could be vulnerable to failure. The 
participants varied widely in their selection of failure probabilities for different vehicular 
components and transportation infrastructure components. For example, 60% of the 
participants agreed that the failure probability of LIDAR could be between 3.01 and 
6.00%. For camera vision, responses from 20% based their failure probability ratios on 
three options: 1.01 to 3.00%, 3.01 to 6.00%, and 6.01 to 10.00%. The remaining 40% 
selected “greater than 10.00%.” Moreover, 50% of the responders selected the failure 
probability of the wheel encoder to be between 1.01 and 3.00%, where earlier it was 
found that the failure probability of the same wheel encoder was 4.00% based on our 
literature review. Even though around 60% thought communication system failure could 
fail the overall autonomous vehicle system, none held DSRC failure responsible. LTE 
communication failure was selected instead. However, participants also agreed that 
autonomous vehicles could be vulnerable to software and human-machine interaction 
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system failures. Table 8 represents the failure probabilities selected regarding vehicular 
component failures by the participants in the first round of the survey. Percentages of 









Failure Probability Ranges (in questionnaire) 






> 10.01 Other 
LIDAR 0 0 60% 0 40% 0 
Radar 0 100% 0 0 0 0 
Camera 0 20% 20% 20% 40%  
GPS Device 25% 0 0 0 50% 25% 
Wheel Encoder 0 50% 50% 0 0 0 
Integration 
Platform 
0 25% 25% 25% 0 25% 
LTE Network 0 0 60% 20% 0 20% 
Software system 0 60% 20% 0 0 20% 



















Among the infrastructure components, the weather, non-autonomous drivers, 
cyclists and pedestrians were considered as the reasons for autonomous vehicles failure 
by the maximum number of participants (about 70%). However, the participants provided 
a wide range of failure probabilities for these infrastructure components.  
Analysis of Survey Results 
Researchers considered consensus measurement as a viable component of data 
analysis and interpretation in research, which measure the level of agreement achieved 
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among the expert panel. However, consensus measurement also utilized a stopping 
criterion of iteration, where group stability and individual stability were used as the 
necessary criterion in many studies. Even though, many researchers suggested that 
consensus measurement does not match with the original idea of the Delphi survey 
method, the measurement parameter could be deployed in achieving agreement over 
qualitative outcomes. However, to draw conclusions for quantitative outcomes, 
inferential statistics could be utilized based on data and the normal frequency distribution 
of dataset. Depending on whether the dataset followed a normal distribution, parametric 
and nonparametric tests have been used in Delphi studies. Many methods can be utilized 
to analyze the Delphi survey results and to calculate the level of consensus. For example, 
the chi square test, McNemar’s change test, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient, Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance 
and F tests. In this research, Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance was used to measure 
the level of consensus between two consecutive rounds of Delphi surveys (Cafiso, Di 
Graziano, & Pappalardo, 2013). Table 9 shows the interpretation of Kendall’s W adopted 





Interpretation of Kendall’s W 
Kendall’s W Interpretation 
W ≤ 0.3 Weak agreement 
0.3 < W ≤ 0.5 Moderate agreement 
0.5 < W ≤ 0.7 Good agreement 





The Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance was utilized to calculate the level of 
consensus, and we decided to continue the iteration till strong agreement was achieved 
(Kendall’s W equals to 0.7 or higher). For instance, 3 out of 5 participants selected 3.01 
to 6.00% as the failure probability of LIDAR, and others selected greater than 10.00%.  
Null Hypothesis: There is no agreement among the participants upon the failure 
probability of LIDAR. 
Alternative Hypothesis: The participants agreed upon the failure probability of Lidar.  
For this hypothesis, Kendall’s W was 0.8 for the question concerning LIDAR 
failure probability. This suggests “strong agreement” among the participants. Also, the 
one-tailed p-value was 0.00302, which indicates no agreement among the participants to 
reject the null hypothesis. Detailed calculation is provided in Appendix D.  
Similarly, Kendall’s W was calculated for the failure probability of camera vision. 
The value of W was equal to 0.2 which represents “weak agreement” among the 
participants. With a one-tailed p-value of 0.41, it is very likely that no agreement was 
reached among the experts. 
Summary  
In summary, the online survey was conducted to include the experts’ opinions in 
risk analysis of autonomous vehicles. Even though, 140 experts were identified and 
invited for their participation in the survey, only seven people responded in time. Due to 
low response rate, the survey results could not be utilized to draw any strong inference. 
Further remarks are presented in Chapter 7, and autonomous vehicle\ microsimulation 




Chapter 6  
Autonomous Vehicle Simulation Results  
After developing the autonomous vehicle navigation algorithms, traffic simulation 
models were being simulated to evaluate the performance of these advanced vehicles on 
our roads in mixed traffic environment. This chapter focuses on analyzing the simulation 
results and estimating the overall safety accomplishments over the replacement of human 
drivers with autonomous vehicle on roads. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the 
first section, the results of crash frequency estimation are described. Later, the impacts of 
autonomous vehicle crashes on the performance of transportation infrastructure are 
presented.    
Crash Frequency Estimation  
In the Vissim traffic simulation software, Interstate-476 (I-476) was sketched and 
calibrated with the real-world traffic volumes where the autonomous vehicle penetration 
level is zero. This model was considered as a base model and compared with the models 
where different market penetration levels of autonomous vehicles were coded. In this 
research, the autonomous vehicles market penetration of 10%, 25%, 50% and 90% were 
modeled as mentioned in Chapter three. The automated platooning was programmed as 
the driving feature of autonomous vehicles. This feature was embedded in simulation 
using the dynamic link library (DLL) file, developed earlier and first mentioned in 
Chapter 3. The Vissim model exported the vehicle information, i.e., current speed, 
acceleration, and the speed difference between a leading and corresponding vehicle, to a 
DLL file. Then, the DLL file evaluated the information imported from the Vissim models 
and calculated the next maneuver of autonomous vehicles using the defined cases in 
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Chapter three. Finally, the DLL file forwarded the corresponding values to Vissim to 
execute the next simulation second in a microsimulation environment.  
Researchers use different transportation parameters, i.e., travel time, queue length, 
density, and delay as road network performance measures in transportation projects. 
However, travel time data is the most preferred one among them, as this parameter can be 
utilized in transportation planning, operations, management, maintenance, and 
evaluations.  Also, in this research, travel time was estimated and evaluated to compare 
the performances of the overall transportation infrastructure after deploying autonomous 
vehicles on roads and highways. Five travel time measurement segments were modeled 
in Vissim to estimate average travel time over a certain period of time, i.e., 900 seconds. 
The demographic location of these five travel time measurement segments are provided 

















63: I-476 South Mainline 
between the Exit 9 off and 
on ramps 
80: I4-76 South Mainline 








80: I-476 South Mainline 
between the Exit 5 off and 
on ramp 
94: I-476 South Mainline 








94: I-476 South Mainline 
between the Exit 3 off and 
on ramp 
110: I-476 South Mainline 








12: I-476 North before the 
Exit 1 on ramp 
30: I-476 North Mainline 




















30: I-476 North Mainline 
between the Exit 3 off and 
on ramps 
42: I476 North Mainline 







The traffic volumes assignment in Vissim follows a stochastic distribution 
(PTVGroup, 2015). This distribution is set up so that a specific time dependent vehicle 
can enter a link in a distributed manner. The time gap between two successive vehicle 
entrances depends on the assigned hourly traffic volume. However, a random number 
generator is used to estimate the time gap values from the software stochastic 
distribution. In Vissim, a parameter called “random seed” actually initializes the random 
number generation (PTVGroup, 2015). It is important to increment this random seed 
number to capture the variability of traffic patterns. In this research, the initial value of 
random seed was assigned as 5, and then this value is incremented by 5 in each 
simulation run. Based on the calculation of the simulation run number, presented in 
Chapter 3, a total of 11 simulation runs were executed for each autonomous vehicle 
market penetration level.   
Each simulation model ran for a period of 4800 simulation seconds, where the 
initial 600 seconds and last 600 seconds were utilized as “warm up” and “cooling off” 
time. These warm up times ensured enough time to fill up the road network and the 
cooling off times provided time to dissolve the queue formed in the simulation period. 
The simulation seconds in between warm up and cooling off times were divided into four 









The travel time for each 15-minute interval was recorded for each of the total 11 
simulation runs for the base model, where the autonomous vehicle percentage was zero to 
total vehicles. The same step was followed for the rest of the simulation models, where 
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autonomous vehicle percentages varied in between 10 and 90. Each of the five travel time 
measurement segments were analyzed and their results were stored accordingly.  
The raw travel time values were recorded for travel time measurement segments 
and are in Appendix E. The travel times cover an interval of 600 to 4200 simulation 
seconds with different autonomous vehicle market penetration levels. Also variations in 
travel times due to different random seed number were tabulated. However, it is difficult 
to draw patterns of travel time variations over the random seed numbers, because a 
random seed number represents different portions under the distribution curve. Later, the 
travel time values for a single penetration level are averaged arithmetically over 11 runs.  
The average travel time over simulation runs with different random seed number 
were then compared. It was found that travel time increased from the time interval of 600 
to 1500 seconds to 3300–4200 seconds, due to increase of queue length. However, a 
certain drop of travel times occurred in time intervals of 2400–3300. The average travel 


























Simulation Time Interval (Sec) 
Travel Time Variation with Autonomous Vehicles Deployment 
AV 0% AV 10% AV 25% AV 50% AV 90%
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It is expected that deployment of autonomous vehicles will reduce traffic 
congestion and increase the roadway capacity, thereby reducing the overall travel time to 
reach from origin to destination. Figure 27 shows that travel time was reduced after 
deployment of autonomous vehicles on roadways. However, the reduction of travel time 
from the base model was calculated for four autonomous vehicle market penetration 
levels, i.e., 10%, 25%, 50% and 90%. It was found that travel time values were reduced 
on an average of 8 to 9% after implementing 10% autonomous vehicles on roads. The 
reduction of travel times increased with the increase of autonomous vehicle penetration 
levels. Figure 28 shows the percentage of travel time reductions for travel time 
Segment 1. This figure shows that an autonomous vehicle can deduce the travel time by 





Figure 28. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for 































Autonomous Vehicle Market Penetration Level 







Similar steps were followed for the rest of the four travel time segments. For 
travel time Segment 2, the travel time reductions varied from range 4% to 51%. With 
10% autonomous vehicles, travel times were reduced by about 4% and those values were 
reduced by about 10 and 30% with 25 and 50% autonomous vehicles. The reductions in 
travel time for Segment 2 are plotted in Figure 29.    
Figure 30 shows that the travel time reductions for travel time Segment 3 after 
autonomous vehicle deployment followed similar trends as noted for previous segments.  
A 14% travel time deduction went into effect after implementing autonomous vehicles as 
10 percent of total vehicles. These travel time reductions increased over the increments of 





Figure 29. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for 































Autonomous Vehicle Market Penetration Level 








Figure 30. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for 





Figure 31. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for 
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Figure 32. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for 




The travel time values were lowered for travel time Segments 4 and 5 by 
increment of the autonomous vehicles market shares, shown in Figure 31 and 32 
respectively. For travel time measurement Segment 4, the overall travel time was 
trimmed by about 62% with an autonomous vehicle penetration level of 90%, and this 
value was around 54% for travel time Segment 5.  
After the performance evaluation, the trajectory files developed during Vissim 
simulation runs were imported into SSAM software. Five models were developed in this 
software for five autonomous vehicle penetration levels. In this research, three types of 
conflicts were considered for safety evaluation, crossing conflicts, lane change conflicts 
and rear end conflicts, as mentioned in Chapter 3. However, the default values of TTC 
and PET were utilized first. The 11 trajectory files were imported in each SSAM model, 
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each trajectory file was evaluated separately and recorded. The conflicts analysis results 
are presented in Appendix F, where TTC = 1.5 seconds and PET = 4.0 seconds.   
After analyzing trajectory files in SSAM, the results were validated using 
student’s t-test. To perform this statistical test, two autonomous vehicle penetration levels 
were considered, they were 0% and 10%. The null hypothesis was the mean of total 
conflicts calculated from 11simulation runs for 0% autonomous vehicle penetration level 
was equal to the mean of total conflicts calculated for 10% autonomous vehicle 
penetration level. With 95% confidence level, it was found that the mean of total conflicts 
for 10% autonomous vehicle penetration level was estimated to be lessened than the same 
value for 0% autonomous vehicle penetration level (with t-statistic = 5.8045 and two-tail 
p-value = 1.115 × 10−5). The means of total conflicts were 143,677 and 123,455 
respectively for autonomous vehicle penetration level 0% and 10%.  
It was found that total numbers of conflicts were decreased with the increase of 
autonomous vehicle market penetration levels. However, the number of lane change 
conflicts increased by 157 conflicts after moving to the 10% autonomous vehicles 
scenario from the 0% autonomous vehicles included. The possible reasoning is 
autonomous vehicles were engaged more on lane changing behaviors as the chances of 
platooning were low due to low autonomous vehicle penetration. The comparison of the 
estimated conflicts among different autonomous vehicle penetration levels with 95% 
confidence is shown in Figure 33.  
The frequency of crossing conflicts reduced 49% after implementing 10% 
autonomous vehicles on the roadways. This reduction value increased to 96% after 
increasing the autonomous vehicle percentage to 90%. The frequency of lane change 
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conflicts increased by 0.5% initially, after implementing 10% autonomous vehicles into 
the total vehicle traffic mix. However, the lane change conflicts started to reduce after 
25% autonomous vehicle penetration, and reduced by approximately 90% after deploying 
autonomous vehicles as 90% of the total vehicle traffic mix. Moreover, rear-end conflicts 
were reduced by 14% to 73% depending on the percentage levels of increase in the 





Figure 33. Conflict reduction frequency with the increase of autonomous vehicle 




Later, the variation of conflict frequencies with different TTC and PET values 
were evaluated. In this research, three values of TTC, i.e. 0.9, 1.2 and 1.5 seconds, and 










































Conflict Frequency Reduction with Autonomous 
Vehicles Deployment  
AV 10% AV 25% AV 50% AV 90%
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reduction with different percentages of autonomous vehicles, i.e. 0%, 10%, 25%, 50% 
and 90%. The variations in conflict frequency reductions with different TTCs and PETs 
are presented in Tables 11 and 12.  
In Table 11, conflict frequency was reduced with the decrease of TTC and 
retention of the same PET. When TTC = 0.9 seconds, a more limited conflicts region was 
evaluated than when TTC = 1.5 seconds, so the number of conflicts was less for TTC = 
0.9 seconds than for TTC = 1.5 seconds. However, these numbers of conflicts were 
reduced by the increase of autonomous vehicle penetration levels into the mainstream 
traffic mix. The conflict frequency was reduced by 61% with 90% autonomous vehicles 
when TTC was 0.9 seconds, and this value was 68% and 73% when TTC = 1.2 and 1.5 









TTC = 0.9 & PET = 
4.0 TTC = 1.2 & PET = 4.0 














AV 0% 958362 -- 1219196 -- 1580449 -- 
AV 10% 519831 45.76 843649 30.80 1358008 14.07 
AV 25% 465888 51.39 632249 48.14 892703 43.52 
AV 50% 432922 54.83 469520 61.49 531988 66.34 




Table 12 presents similar conflicts analysis with different PET values, which was 
3.0 seconds.  Notably, the number of total conflicts when PET = 3.0 seconds were similar 
as the total conflicts when PET = 4.0, but this was only when autonomous vehicle 
115 
 
penetration level was 0%. However, for other autonomous vehicle penetration levels, the 
numbers of total conflicts when PET = 3.0 seconds varied significantly and were actually 
lower than similar values when PET = 4.0 seconds. With 90% autonomous vehicles, the 
total conflicts were reduced by 61, 69 and 74% when TTC values were 0.9, 1.2 and 1.5 









TTC = 0.9 & PET = 3.0 
TTC = 1.2 & PET = 
3.0 














AV 0% 958362 -- 1219196 -- 1580449 -- 
AV 10% 475523 50.38 654373 46.33 982021 37.86 
AV 25% 444343 53.64 539091 55.78 707800 55.22 
AV 50% 428933 55.24 451511 62.97 493747 68.76 




Researchers identified that the number of conflicts calculated using SSAM can be 
significantly correlated with actual crash data (Archer, 2005; Dijkstra et al., 2010; 
Gettman & Head, 2003). However, Vogt utilized coefficient of determination (𝑅2) to 
measure this correlation between SSAM predicted conflict results and actual crash data, 
and found that it varied within a range of 0.31 and 0.51 depending on road segment type, 
with an average of 𝑅2 = 0.41for all road types, i.e. urban and rural (Vogt, 1999). 
Additionally it was found that a mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) value of 18% in 
prediction performance of SSAM models (Huang et al., 2013). It is also important to 
mention that even for same road segments SSAM predicted different values of conflicts 
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when trajectory files are generated from different traffic simulation software, i.e. Vissim, 
Aimsun, Paramics and Texas. For instance, a study found that SSAM estimated 10 times 
more conflicts after analyzing imported files from Texas than Vissim (Gettman & Head, 
2008). Though, SSAM prediction models demonstrate a success in analysis of proposed 
traffic facilities and comparison between two alternatives, the results of these models are 
not definitive, more likely qualitative. It is recommended that the SSAM should be 
utilized to rank the proposed surrogate measures, rather than estimating number of 
crashes (Gettman & Head, 2008).   
Integration of Fault Tree and Simulation Modeling  
The second phase of simulation analysis was measuring the impact of 
autonomous vehicle failures in mixed traffic streams. The similar DLL file was utilized 
here to simulate autonomous vehicle platooning. In this phase, the autonomous vehicle 
penetration level was considered 10% as the fault tree risk analysis models were 
developed assuming an autonomous vehicle penetration level of 10%. However, an 
additional visual basic code was used to monitor and control the maneuvers of 
autonomous vehicles. In fault tree models, it was determined that autonomous vehicles 
could fail to navigate autonomously 158 times in one million miles. Based on this 
information it could be reported that autonomous vehicle can drive an average 6,329 
miles, i.e., 1,000,000/158, before a failure occurs. As mentioned in chapter three, an 
autonomous vehicle was randomly selected to fail, when total distances covered by all 
vehicles exceeded 6,329 miles. It was not possible to simulate one vehicle to cover the 
entire length of 6329 over a certain period within the limited the length of roadways in 
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the selected study region. To resolve this issue, the distances covered by all vehicles were 
selected to control autonomous vehicle failure scenarios.  
The simulation was run between 600 to 4200 simulation seconds; however, the 
time interval used was 100 seconds in this phase to capture a more accurate variation in 
travel time. The random seed value was assigned 1, and that value remained the same in 
both crash and non-crash scenarios. However, within the time frame and the limited 
region of roadways there were two simulated crashes modeled on the monitored 
roadways, when the total distances covered by all autonomous vehicles were 6,329 and 
12,865 respectively. It was assumed that the crashed vehicle would remain at velocity = 0 
mph on the incident location for 180 seconds before the emergency response team 
appeared. After this response period the crashed vehicle would be removed from the 
traffic network using a Visual Basic code.  
The travel time results for travel time measurement Segment 1 collected from 
Vissim are presented in Figure 34. The travel time values were exactly equal for two 
simulation runs (since they both had the same random seed number), until the failure of 
the autonomous vehicle occurred. The first autonomous vehicle incident occurred on 
another travel time segment path (not on the Segment 1 travel time), so that incident did 
not impact the Segment 1 performance. However, the second failure happened in the 
Segment 1 time interval of 3700-3800 and that impacted travel time results. The travel 
times between the failure and non-failure scenarios varied by 0.24%, and this was 
significantly lower. However, large scale modeling with multiple crash scenarios led to 









In summary, the autonomous vehicles’ microsimulation results were presented in 
this chapter. It also covered the safety and operational benefits of deploying these 
vehicles on our roads and highways. To introduce randomness in simulation, random 
seed values were varied within a wide range of 5 to 55. Thus, the travel time from origin 
to destination could be reduced by 50% after deploying 90% autonomous vehicles of the 
total vehicles available for this study. Furthermore, traffic crashes could be reduced by 
replacing human drivers with autonomous vehicles. With a 90% autonomous vehicle 
penetration level, 73% of all conflicts were eliminated there by saving human lives and 
avoiding injuries and property damage. Remarks on the simulation results are presented 
























Impact of Autonomous Vehicle Failure on 
Performance 
AV 10% without Crash AV 10% with Crash
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Recommendations  
The first step of this thesis was to identify the potential sources of risks associated 
with the failure of autonomous vehicle navigation. The failure of any single component 
that could lead to the failure of the overall autonomous system was considered and 
evaluated. Then, the fault tree-based risk analysis method was utilized to analyze the 
performance of the autonomous vehicle system. The reliability of each autonomous 
vehicle component was determined through the comprehensive literature review. The 
failure probabilities of vehicular components were plugged into the developed fault tree 
structure and the analysis was run in the software to identify the most critical 
components. These component failures could lead to overall system crashes in the 
shortest possible time. Autonomous vehicle navigation could be stopped due to the 
failures of either vehicular components or transportation infrastructure components. The 
combined failure probability was determined to be 0.0158048% per mile of travel. 
Furthermore, the autonomous vehicle lifetime status value was projected to be capable of 
158 failure incidents in 1,000,000 miles of travel due to failure of either vehicular 
components, or infrastructure components in a mixed traffic stream. These results could 
be used to develop risk minimization strategies to eliminate or reduce system failures and 
finally ensure safety to the passengers of autonomous vehicles. Furthermore, the results 
of fault-based risk analysis were quantitatively validated with the real-world data of 
autonomous vehicle testing, collected from the California DMV webserver. 
However, reckless human drivers were found to be one of most critical factors 
affecting autonomous vehicle navigation. They are the dominant concern for autonomous 
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vehicles in a mixed traffic stream. Yet, at the initial stage of autonomous vehicle 
deployment, these advanced vehicles need to share the roads and highways with non-
autonomous drivers. Based on the results of this research, the policymakers should 
develop certain rules and regulations to facilitate the sharing of roads and highways. 
Researchers recommend separate lanes for autonomous and non-autonomous drivers on 
multilane sections of roadways as one potential solution (Chen, He, Yin, & Du, 2017), 
(Turnbull, 2015). Other researchers claimed that installation of black boxes in 
autonomous vehicles to record the sensors data and surrounding information, could be 
useful for crash investigations after collisions between autonomous vehicles and 
conventional vehicles driven by non-autonomous drivers (Nothdurft et al., 2011). 
However, further research is needed to confirm the advantages and hence, the 
applicability of these solutions.  
The second step was an online survey seeking further information of the vehicular 
components failure probabilities from the subject matter experts. The Delphi survey 
method was utilized to prepare the survey framework. The benefit of this survey method 
was to develop multi-round anonymous interactive participation through questionnaires. 
However, only seven experts responded among the 140 experts invited to participate in 
the online survey. The survey results showed that experts agreed “strongly” on the 
question asking the failure probability of LIDAR, whereas “weak agreement” was found 
in the case of a camera failure probability value. However, due to the small participation 
pool, the survey results are not recommended to represent the majority of expert’ 
opinions nor to draw a strong inference due to the limited number of responses.  
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Traffic microsimulation was carried out in the third step of this thesis. The 
algorithms were developed and then utilized to model autonomous navigation in a 
microscopic traffic simulation environment. A segment of interstate highway in 
Pennsylvania was modeled as the study region. Then, the traffic model was calibrated 
and validated to represent the real-world traffic scenarios. The gradual increase of 
autonomous vehicle market penetration level was drawn by using different percentages of 
autonomous vehicle among all transportation modes, i.e. 0%, 10%, 25%, 50% and 90%.  
Five travel time segments of different lengths and directions were designed and 
evaluated with different autonomous vehicle penetration levels. To generate randomness 
in simulation results the random seed number was varied within a range of 5 to 55. After 
executing the simulation with different autonomous vehicle-penetration scenarios, the 
travel times for each 15-minute interval were recorded. After analyzing the travel time 
data, it was found that autonomous vehicle can reduce travel time by 51 to 64% with a 
90% market penetration level. However, the trajectory files generated by traffic 
simulation were exported to investigate the safety of autonomous vehicles and estimate 
the conflict frequencies. It was found that about 73% of total conflicts which could result 
in a traffic crash could be avoided by replacing 90% of human drivers with autonomous 
vehicles. Moreover, it was found that conflict frequencies fluctuated with the change in 
TTC and PET values. Finally, a comparison between a failure and non-failure scenario of 




- In this thesis it was not possible to conduct statistical validation due to limited 
availability of autonomous vehicle testing data. Further research is recommended for 
comparing the fault tree-based risk analysis results with real-world risk analyses.  
- In this research, all the vehicular components were assumed to represent an independent 
and individual component. The interdependency among the vehicular components was 
not considered. However, it is recommended that the interdependency among these 
components should be investigated before integrating into another fault tree analysis. 
Also, the developed fault tree should be revised based on the interdependency analysis.  
- The failure probabilities of vehicular components were assumed to be constant over the 
lifetime of these components. However, the lifetime performance of these components 
could vary. Variation in the performance of sensors over time (i.e., time dependency on 
reliability) should be considered. In future research, the failure probabilities of these 
components should be revised based on either experts’ opinions or further experimental 
testing.  
-  The final fault tree was developed by combining the developed fault tree based on 
vehicular component failures and the developed fault tree based on transportation 
infrastructure components failure. It was assumed that these two fault trees were 
independent. However, these fault trees could overlap depending on the nature of the 
critical components’ failure. The interdependency of these two trees should be considered 
in future studies.  
- A traffic simulation model was calibrated using real-world data in this research, and it 
was assumed that this calibration would be valid after deployment of autonomous 
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vehicles. In the future, traffic models should be calibrated based on road-tested 
autonomous vehicle trip information.  
- In traffic simulation, travel demands and choice of modes were not considered; 
however, with the deployment of autonomous vehicles, these values should be updated 
and considered in traffic microsimulation.  
- In the future, advanced simulators will be utilized to further analyze the safety 
improvement of autonomous vehicles over human drivers. Two of the currently available 
simulator packages are: CarSim (CarSim, 2017), and Webots (Webots, 2017). These 
advance simulators could provide more accurate results than the results presented in this 
research from the integration between traffic microsimulation and the SSAM 
tool.  United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)-registered, professional 
autonomous vehicle simulation packages allow coding and analyses of model vehicle 
dynamics as well as traffic crash scenarios, which does a better job of  simulating realistic 
behavior.  
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Appendix A  














1 5 600 – 1500 31.25272 
2 10 600 – 1500 31.63295 
3 15 600 – 1500 29.05456 
4 20 600 – 1500 31.14431 
5 25 600 – 1500 30.92869 
6 30 600 – 1500 30.1724 
7 35 600 – 1500 30.14788 
8 40 600 – 1500 31.44893 
9 45 600 – 1500 29.95752 
10 50 600 – 1500 30.89594 
Average 30.66359 
Standard Deviation 0.806473 
 



















1 5 1500 – 2400 27.46423 
2 10 1500 – 2400 26.8748 
3 15 1500 – 2400 25.69973 
4 20 1500 – 2400 25.69288 













6 30 1500 – 2400 26.74075 
7 35 1500 – 2400 25.29741 
8 40 1500 – 2400 26.50471 
9 45 1500 – 2400 26.59292 
10 50 1500 – 2400 25.47071 
Average 26.17138 
Standard Deviation 0.754143 
 



















1 5 2400 – 3300 24.44064 
2 10 2400 – 3300 24.02435 
3 15 2400 – 3300 23.40577 
4 20 2400 – 3300 22.74352 
5 25 2400 – 3300 22.16012 
6 30 2400 – 3300 24.02695 
7 35 2400 – 3300 22.17685 
8 40 2400 – 3300 23.42267 
9 45 2400 – 3300 23.97453 
10 50 2400 – 3300 22.39201 
Average 23.27674 
Standard Deviation 0.851464 
 






















1 5 3300 – 4200 21.74673 
2 10 3300 – 4200 22.10281 
3 15 3300 – 4200 21.24155 
4 20 3300 – 4200 20.48982 
5 25 3300 – 4200 19.77108 
6 30 3300 – 4200 21.91904 
7 35 3300 – 4200 19.96118 
8 40 3300 – 4200 21.25557 
9 45 3300 – 4200 21.67305 
10 50 3300 – 4200 20.07585 
Average 21.02367 
Standard Deviation 0.875165 
 









Table 17  
Calculation based on average travel time for different time interval for travel time 






















(sec) for time 
interval 3300-
4200 secs 
1 5 289.32 300.07 304.58 333.91 
2 10 304.57 322.29 319.85 351.96 
3 15 316.32 335.71 333.11 360.21 
4 20 295.44 321.49 328.47 342.9 
5 25 322.43 343.74 355.64 387.65 
6 30 337.17 349.18 343.59 386.76 
7 35 311.58 328.2 334.11 367.88 
8 40 293.79 307.55 314.11 331.61 



























(sec) for time 
interval 3300-
4200 secs 
10 50 328.51 354.56 368.89 397.45 
Average 312.255 330.961 333.693 365.147 
SD 16.12081 18.26060 19.06049 24.70667 
Number of 
Simulation Runs 




Appendix B  
External Driver Model Code (DLL File Development) 
/* June. 2017 */ 
/*  Autonomous Platooning for MS Thesis Work */ 




/* These values are placeholders and declarations. */ 
/*========    Current Vehicle    ======================*/ 
double time_step = 0.0; 
long current_vehID = 0; 
long current_lane = 0; 
double current_lateral_pos = 0.0; 
double current_speed = 0.0; 
double current_accerleration = 0.0; 
double current_length = 0.0; 
double max_acceleration = 0.0; 
long    turning_indicator    = 0; 
long current_category = 0; 
double desired_velocity = 0.0; 
double current_type = 0.0; 
long vehicle_color = RGB(0,0,0); 
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/*==========    Lead Vehicle    ======================*/ 
long lead_vehID = 0; 
double lead_vehicle_lateral_position = 0.0; 
double  lead_vehicle_distance         = 0.0; 
double  lead_vehicle_speed_difference = 0.0; 
double lead_vehicle_acceleration = 0.0; 
double  lead_vehicle_length    =   0.0; 
long lead_vehicle_category = 0; 
/*==========    Desired     ======================*/ 
double desired_speed_limit  = 0.0; 
double  desired_acceleration = 0.0; 
double  desired_lane_angle   = 0.0; 
long    active_lane_change   = 0; 
long    rel_target_lane      = 0; 
/*==============================================================
============*/ 
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HANDLE  hModule, 
                       DWORD   ul_reason_for_call, 
                       LPVOID  lpReserved) 
{ 
  switch (ul_reason_for_call) { 
      case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: 
      case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: 
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      case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: 
      case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: 
         break; 
  } 




DRIVERMODEL_API  int  DriverModelSetValue (long   type, 
                                           long   index1, 
                                           long   index2, 
                                           long   long_value, 
                                           double double_value, 
                                           char   *string_value) 
{ 
  /* Sets the value of a data object of type <type>, selected by <index1> */ 
  /* and possibly <index2>, to <long_value>, <double_value> or            */ 
  /* <*string_value> (object and value selection depending on <type>).    */ 
  /* Return value is 1 on success, otherwise 0.                           */ 
 
  switch (type) { 
    case DRIVER_DATA_PATH                   : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_TIMESTEP               : 
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      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_TIME                   : 
      time_step = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ID                 : 
      /* reset leading vehicle's data for this new vehicle */ 
      current_vehID = long_value; 
      /* lead_vehicle_distance         = 999.0; 
      lead_vehicle_speed_difference = -99.0; 
      lead_vehicle_length           =   0.0; */ 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LANE               : 
        current_lane = long_value; 
  return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ODOMETER           : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LANE_ANGLE         : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LATERAL_POSITION   : 
      current_lateral_pos = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_VELOCITY           : 
      /* current vehicle velocity */ 
      current_speed = double_value; 
      return 1; 
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    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ACCELERATION       : 
      /* vehicle's current acceleration */ 
      current_accerleration = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LENGTH             : 
        /* vehicle's current length */ 
        current_length = double_value; 
        return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_WIDTH              : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_WEIGHT             : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_MAX_ACCELERATION   : 
      /* vehicle's current maximum acceleration */ 
      max_acceleration = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_TURNING_INDICATOR  : 
      turning_indicator = long_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_CATEGORY           : 
        /* vehicle's category */ 
        current_category = long_value; 
        return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_PREFERRED_REL_LANE : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_USE_PREFERRED_LANE : 
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      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_DESIRED_VELOCITY   : 
      /* vehicle's desired velocity */ 
      desired_velocity = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_X_COORDINATE       : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_Y_COORDINATE       : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_TYPE               : 
      /* vehicle's current type */ 
      current_type = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_COLOR              : 
      vehicle_color = long_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_CURRENT_LINK       : 
      return 0; /* (To avoid getting sent lots of DRIVER_DATA_VEH_NEXT_LINKS 
messages) */ 
                /* Must return 1 if these messages are to be sent from VISSIM!         */ 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_NEXT_LINKS         : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ACTIVE_LANE_CHANGE : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_REL_TARGET_LANE    : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_ID                : 
      /* lead vehicle's ID */ 
159 
 
      if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { 
            lead_vehID = long_value; 
      } 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LANE_ANGLE        : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LATERAL_POSITION  : 
       /* lead vehicle's lateral position */ 
       if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1){/* leading vehicle on the same lane as following 
vehicle */ 
        lead_vehicle_lateral_position = double_value; 
       } 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_DISTANCE          : 
      /* lead vehicle's distance */ 
      if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */ 
        lead_vehicle_distance = double_value; 
      } 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_REL_VELOCITY      : 
      if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */ 
        lead_vehicle_speed_difference = double_value; 
      } 
      return 1; 
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    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_ACCELERATION      : 
      if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */ 
        lead_vehicle_acceleration = double_value; 
      } 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LENGTH            : 
      if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */ 
        lead_vehicle_length = double_value; 
      } 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_WIDTH             : 
        return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_WEIGHT            : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_TURNING_INDICATOR : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_CATEGORY          : 
      if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */ 
            lead_vehicle_category = long_value; 
      } 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LANE_CHANGE       : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_NO_OF_LANES            : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_LANE_WIDTH             : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_LANE_END_DISTANCE      : 
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    case DRIVER_DATA_RADIUS                 : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_MIN_RADIUS             : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_DIST_TO_MIN_RADIUS     : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SLOPE                  : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SLOPE_AHEAD            : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SIGNAL_DISTANCE        : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SIGNAL_STATE           : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SIGNAL_STATE_START     : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SPEED_LIMIT_DISTANCE   : 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SPEED_LIMIT_VALUE      : 
        desired_speed_limit = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_ACCELERATION : 
      desired_acceleration = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_LANE_ANGLE : 
      desired_lane_angle = double_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_ACTIVE_LANE_CHANGE : 
      active_lane_change = long_value; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_REL_TARGET_LANE : 
      rel_target_lane = long_value; 
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      return 1; 
    default : 
      return 0; 
  } 
} 
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
DRIVERMODEL_API  int  DriverModelGetValue (long   type, 
                                           long   index1, 
                                           long   index2, 
                                           long   *long_value, 
                                           double *double_value, 
                                           char   **string_value) 
{ 
  /* Gets the value of a data object of type <type>, selected by <index1> */ 
  /* and possibly <index2>, and writes that value to <*double_value>,     */ 
  /* <*float_value> or <**string_value> (object and value selection       */ 
  /* depending on <type>).                                                */ 
  /* Return value is 1 on success, otherwise 0.                           */ 
  switch (type) { 
    case DRIVER_DATA_STATUS : 
      *long_value = 0; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_TURNING_INDICATOR : 
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      *long_value = turning_indicator; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_DESIRED_VELOCITY   : 
      *double_value = desired_velocity; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_COLOR : 
      *long_value = vehicle_color; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_WANTS_SUGGESTION : 
      *long_value = 1; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_ACCELERATION : {          /* START 
ACCELERATION FUNCTION */ 
      double net_distance       = lead_vehicle_distance - lead_vehicle_length;       /* Net 
distance */ 
      double lead_vehicle_speed = current_speed - lead_vehicle_speed_difference;    /* 
Lead vehicle speed */ 
      double desired_distance = 2; /* this is in meter. times 1 s = 2.0*/ 
      /* Changing this value will change the distance from the lead vehicle where the 
autonomous car will emergency brake. Make sure this is less than desired_distance. */ 
      double emergency_stop_distance = 1; 
      long regular_cat = current_category; 
      long lead_cat = lead_vehicle_category; 
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      if (regular_cat == lead_cat) { 
        if (lead_vehicle_speed_difference > 0){ 
            /* Faster than the leading vehicle */ 
            if (lead_vehicle_speed > 0) { 
                /* Not behind standstill vehicle (lead_vehicle_speed > 0)*/ 
                if (net_distance > desired_distance) { 
                    /* slow down to leading vehicle's speed with 1 s time gap */ 
                    desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                   * lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                   / (net_distance - desired_distance) 
                                   / 2.0; 
                } 
                else { 
                    /* try to increase distance */ 
                    desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference - 1.0; 
                    if (net_distance < emergency_stop_distance) { 
                        desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                    * lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                    / (emergency_stop_distance - net_distance) 
                                    / 2.0;                    /* emergency braking */ 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
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            else { 
                /* leading vehicle is standing still  (lead_vehicle_speed = 0)*/ 
                if (net_distance < emergency_stop_distance) { 
                    desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                    * lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                    / (emergency_stop_distance - net_distance) 
                                    / 2.0;                    /* emergency braking */ 
                } 
                else { 
                /* brake to standstill in 1.0 m distance */ 
                desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                   * lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                   / (net_distance - emergency_stop_distance) 
                                   / 2.0; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        /* --------if (lead_vehicle_speed_difference <= 0)---------- */ 
        /* Slower than the leading vehicle */ 
        else { 
            /* accelerate to min of leading vehicle's speed and own desired speed */ 
            /* vehicle is far from leading vehicle: try to decrease distance */ 
            if (net_distance > desired_distance) { 
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                desired_acceleration = lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                   * lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                   / (net_distance - desired_distance) 
                                   / 2.0; 
            } 
            else { 
                /* vehicle is within desired distance of leading vehicle: try to decrease distance 
*/ 
                desired_acceleration = lead_vehicle_speed_difference + 1.0; 
                /* vehicle is very close to leading vehicle: try to increase distance */ 
                if (net_distance < emergency_stop_distance) { 
                        desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                    * lead_vehicle_speed_difference 
                                    / (emergency_stop_distance - net_distance) 
                                    / 2.0;                    /* emergency braking */ 
                } 
            } 
        } 
      *double_value = desired_acceleration; 
      } 
      else { 
           *double_value = desired_acceleration; 
      } 
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      return 1; 
    } 
    case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_LANE_ANGLE : 
      *double_value = desired_lane_angle; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_ACTIVE_LANE_CHANGE : 
      *long_value = active_lane_change; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_REL_TARGET_LANE : 
      *long_value = rel_target_lane; 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_DATA_SIMPLE_LANECHANGE : 
      *long_value = 1; 
      return 1; 
    default : 
      return 0; 




DRIVERMODEL_API  int  DriverModelExecuteCommand (long number) 
{ 
  /* Executes the command <number> if that is available in the driver */ 
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  /* module. Return value is 1 on success, otherwise 0.               */ 
  switch (number) { 
    case DRIVER_COMMAND_INIT : 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_COMMAND_CREATE_DRIVER : 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_COMMAND_KILL_DRIVER : 
      return 1; 
    case DRIVER_COMMAND_MOVE_DRIVER : 
      return 1; 
    default : 
      return 0; 
  } 
} 
resource.rc file 
#define IDS_STRING1     1 
#define IDS_STRING2     2 
#define IDS_STRING3     3 
STRINGTABLE 
{ 
    IDS_STRING1 "DriverModelSetValue" 
    IDS_STRING2 "DriverModelGetValue" 







Code for Integration of Fault Tree and Simulation Modeling 
'Programmer: Plaban Das, MS Thesis Work   
'Last Update: 7-12-2017 
Imports VISSIMLIB 
Module Module1 
    Sub Main() 
        ' Declaration of Variables 
        Dim Vissim As Object 
        Dim veh As VISSIMLIB.IVehicle 
        Dim simend As Integer 
        Dim vehNo As Integer 
        ' Distance measured in Vissim in meters  
        Dim total_dis As Double = 0 
        Dim over_single_sec As Double = 0 
        Dim j As Integer = 0 : Dim aa As Integer = 0 : Dim bb As Integer = 1 ' : Dim ad As 
Integer = 0 
        Dim total_distance_traveled(1, j) As Double : Dim multiplier As Integer = 100 : 
Dim crash_start As Integer = 0 
        'Dim comp As Integer = 2 
 
        ' Results from fault tree and convert miles value to meters 
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        Dim mile_per_inci As Double = (1000000 / 158) ' Its original value is = 1000000/ 
158 = 6330 
        Dim conversion_factor As Double = 1609.34 ' Conversion factor from mile to 
meter, as values in vissim are in meters 
        Dim response_time As Double = 180 ' Its original value is = 3 mins = 180 sec 
        Dim pre_value As Double 
        Dim bool As Boolean = False 
        Dim random_veh As Integer 
        Dim target_veh As Integer 
        'Load Vissim file with 32 bit version  
        Vissim = CreateObject("Vissim.Vissim-32.700") 
        'Load Vissim File from Drive Desired Location  
        Vissim.Loadnet("C:\Users\dasp6\Downloads\Research_Autonomous Car_Summer 
2015_Thesis\Autonomous VISSIM\VISSIM Models\Vissim Model_I476\i476 
network.inpx") 
        simend = Vissim.Simulation.AttValue("SimPeriod") 
        MsgBox(simend) 
 
        For i = 1 To simend 
            'Run simulation single step  
            Vissim.Simulation.RunSingleStep 
            For Each veh In Vissim.Net.Vehicles 
                'Search all vehicle  
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                If veh.AttValue("VehType") = 500 Then 
                    'Look for autonomous vehicle, they have vehicle type = 400  
                    vehNo = veh.AttValue("NO") 
                    total_dis = veh.AttValue("DistTravTotal") 
                    If aa < bb Then 
                        total_distance_traveled(0, j) = vehNo 
                        total_distance_traveled(1, j) = total_dis 
                        aa = 2 
                    End If 
 
                    For jj = 0 To ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1) 
                        If total_distance_traveled(0, jj) = vehNo Then 
                            total_distance_traveled(1, jj) = total_dis 
                            Exit For 
                        ElseIf (total_distance_traveled(0, jj) <> vehNo) Then 
                            If (jj < ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1)) Then 
                                GoTo Line1 
                            ElseIf (jj = ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1)) Then 
                                j = j + 1 
                                ReDim Preserve total_distance_traveled(1, j) 
                                total_distance_traveled(0, j) = vehNo 
                                total_distance_traveled(1, j) = total_dis 
                            End If 
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                        End If 
Line1:              Next 
 
                    bool = True 
                End If 
            Next 
 
            If bool = True Then 
                over_single_sec = 0 
                For ii = 0 To ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1) 
                    over_single_sec = over_single_sec + total_distance_traveled(1, ii) 
                Next 
            End If 
            'Here is for the crash conditions  
            If over_single_sec > (multiplier * mile_per_inci * conversion_factor) Then 
                'Now total distance is higher than the crash distance 
                'Cond================================================== 
                Dim all_veh_count(0) As Integer 
                Dim pp As Integer = 0 
                For Each veh In Vissim.Net.Vehicles 
                    If veh.AttValue("VehType") = 500 Then 
                        If pp = 0 Then 
                            all_veh_count(pp) = veh.AttValue("NO") 
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                            GoTo Line2 
                        End If 
                        ReDim Preserve all_veh_count(pp) 
                        all_veh_count(pp) = veh.AttValue("NO") 
Line2:                  pp = pp + 1 
                    End If 
                Next 
                'Select a vehicle randomly to cause a crash  
                random_veh = CInt(Int(((all_veh_count.Length) * Rnd()) + 0)) 
                If random_veh = all_veh_count.Length Then 
                    random_veh = random_veh - 1 
                End If 
                target_veh = all_veh_count(random_veh) 
                place_holder = all_veh_count 
                'Show the vehicle no to visualize  
                MsgBox("Crashed Vehicle No:" & target_veh) 
                multiplier = multiplier + 1 
                crash_start = i 
            End If 
            'Stop  the vehicle till response team appear at the crash scene  
            If (crash_start <> 0) And (i <= (crash_start + response_time)) Then 
                If (crash_start = i) Then 
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                    pre_value = 
Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("DesSpeed") 
                End If 
                Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("DesSpeed") = 0 
                Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("Speed") = 0 
            ElseIf (crash_start <> 0) And (i = (crash_start + response_time + 1)) Then 
                'Response team appeared 
                Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("DesSpeed") = 
pre_value 
                Vissim.Net.Vehicles.RemoveVehicle(target_veh) 
            End If 
        Next 
        MsgBox("End") 
        Vissim = Nothing 










Responses of the question asking failure probability of LIDAR  
Parti- 
cipants 
Set of Options (failure probability ranges) in the question  
A: < 1.00 B:  1.01 to 
3.00 
C: 3.01 to 
6.00 
D:  6.01 to 
10.00 
E: > 10.00 
1 0 0 5 0 0 
2 0 0 5 0 0 
3 0 0 5 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 5 




Number of experts, m = 5 
Number of options, n = 5 
Now, 𝑅 =  ∑ (𝑅𝑖 −  ?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑖= 1  = 200, where for each option, 𝑅𝑖 is the sum of the rating 
participants j provides to a specific option: 𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1  and ?̅? is the mean of the 𝑅𝑖.  
Kendall’s W = 
12 ×𝑅
𝑚2 ×(𝑛3 − 𝑛)





Responses of the question asking failure probability of camera 
Parti- 
cipants 





C: 3.01 to 
6.00 




1 0 5 0 0 0 
2 0 0 5 0 0 
3 0 0 0 5 0 
4 0 0 0 0 5 
5 0 0 0 0 5 
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As we mentioned before, m = 5, and n = 5, 
Now, 𝑅 =  ∑ (𝑅𝑖 −  ?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑖= 1  = 50  
Kendall’s W = 
12 ×𝑅
𝑚2 ×(𝑛3 − 𝑛)















Travel Time (in seconds) 
AV 0% AV 10% AV 25% AV 50% AV 90% 
5 
600-1500 289.32 266.65 237.11 209.74 157.92 
1500-2400 300.07 282.26 259.10 222.87 164.54 
2400-3300 304.58 271.18 244.13 218.49 153.88 
3300-4200 333.91 307.62 266.10 242.97 179.89 
10 
600-1500 304.57 283.41 255.42 230.15 158.45 
1500-2400 322.29 299.28 294.55 249.50 177.33 
2400-3300 319.85 287.13 267.97 243.23 171.97 
3300-4200 351.96 329.81 316.54 271.81 195.19 
15 
600-1500 316.30 279.88 253.16 194.40 139.46 
1500-2400 335.71 303.78 295.28 231.00 166.20 
2400-3300 333.11 287.08 257.53 226.92 153.18 
3300-4200 360.21 334.32 319.28 240.06 177.23 
20 
600-1500 295.44 283.38 268.69 227.83 145.82 
1500-2400 321.49 311.38 291.27 251.30 160.32 
2400-3300 328.47 299.26 270.88 236.88 151.47 
3300-4200 342.90 333.66 308.23 266.95 194.63 
25 
600-1500 322.43 292.65 262.04 232.97 126.91 
1500-2400 343.74 312.69 304.28 254.04 164.57 
2400-3300 355.64 295.14 298.27 249.88 147.67 
3300-4200 387.65 344.59 315.59 277.64 192.37 
30 
600-1500 337.17 296.44 229.94 194.06 163.42 
1500-2400 349.18 307.72 244.90 204.38 182.59 
2400-3300 343.59 297.06 232.36 208.50 171.23 
3300-4200 386.76 331.37 274.92 237.34 191.15 
35 
600-1500 311.58 276.66 256.72 223.36 123.92 
1500-2400 328.20 303.24 291.65 265.91 164.36 
2400-3300 334.11 288.00 277.25 231.32 141.48 










Travel Time (in seconds) 
AV 0% AV 10% AV 25% AV 50% AV 90% 
40 
600-1500 293.80 287.84 268.59 234.22 146.37 
1500-2400 307.55 311.62 292.64 264.60 165.73 
2400-3300 314.11 298.85 271.67 255.23 162.30 
3300-4200 331.61 336.49 317.71 268.70 185.92 
45 
600-1500 323.42 285.01 265.29 235.34 166.89 
1500-2400 346.82 292.69 304.80 257.62 183.85 
2400-3300 334.58 290.45 295.39 267.06 172.48 
3300-4200 391.14 313.02 326.77 268.77 195.85 
50 
600-1500 328.50 296.95 262.71 226.23 135.08 
1500-2400 354.56 304.14 298.85 248.91 143.72 
2400-3300 368.89 288.94 263.83 249.60 137.09 
3300-4200 397.45 349.28 306.85 261.70 150.56 
55 
600-1500 296.95 277.67 230.40 198.18 159.90 
1500-2400 321.51 297.83 264.25 239.20 175.99 
2400-3300 319.67 282.62 239.85 231.53 147.96 
3300-4200 347.95 321.27 271.24 243.94 197.84 
Average 
600-1500 310.9 284.2 253.6 218.8 147.6 
1500-2400 330.1 302.4 285.6 244.5 168.1 
2400-3300 332.4 289.6 265.4 238.1 155.5 


























AV 0% 5 6 130180 2868 133054 
10 9 129848 3056 132913 
15 20 143679 2949 146648 
20 24 143567 3066 146657 
25 11 153577 3138 156726 
30 34 133322 3091 136447 
35 27 152268 3269 155564 
40 3 132972 2943 135918 
45 13 137473 3080 140566 
50 7 149728 3188 152923 
55 22 140111 2900 143033 
Total  176 1546725 33548 1580449 
AV 10% 5 8 110036 2873 112917 
10 10 113734 2927 116671 
15 5 117349 2951 120305 
20 6 127766 2993 130765 
25 11 121691 3042 124744 
30 7 120493 3207 123707 
35 5 127636 3239 130880 
40 10 112945 2990 115945 
45 7 115630 3104 118741 
50 12 134583 3327 137922 
55 8 122351 3052 125411 






















AV 25% 5 5 73083 1812 74900 
10 2 80067 1974 82043 
15 4 70037 1779 71820 
20 3 85475 1819 87297 
25 1 81518 1907 83426 
30 3 78988 1862 80853 
35 3 79628 1985 81616 
40 6 81256 2046 83308 
45 3 74018 1927 75948 
50 7 92025 1996 94028 
55 2 75647 1815 77464 
Total  39 871742 20922 892703 
AV 50% 5 5 45968 852 46825 
10 1 47984 933 48918 
15 0 45807 776 46583 
20 3 50316 997 51316 
25 5 45602 881 46488 
30 3 48442 937 49382 
35 1 48783 901 49685 
40 1 48079 846 48926 
45 0 44270 771 45041 
50 1 50066 968 51035 
55 3 46927 859 47789 
Total  23 522244 9721 531988 
AV 90% 5 1 36906 277 37184 
10 0 38017 281 38298 
15 0 36233 296 36529 
20 1 39108 301 39410 
25 0 35920 230 36150 
30 1 38395 321 38717 
35 0 37105 325 37430 
40 0 37622 276 37898 
45 1 36290 256 36547 
50 1 38655 273 38929 
55 2 36270 272 36544 
Total  7 410521 3108 413636 
 
